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Overview of the activities implemented jointly policy 
research project 
This report summarises the outputs from the EDRC Activities Implemented 
Jointly (AIJ) Pohcy Research Project, whose goal was to facilitate South Africa's 
efforts to develop pohcy on AIJ and evaluate potential pilot projects. Funding for 
the project was provided by the South African Human Sdences Research Council 
programme on Global Change and Sodal Transformation, Eskom and the US-
South Africa Binational Commission (funded from the US Agency for 
International Development and managed by the US Information Service). 
"Activities implemented jointly" is the name given to projects or pohdes 
undertaken collaboratively among countries to mitigate the threat of chmate 
change within the scope of the United Nations Framework Convention on Chmate 
Change (UNFCCC). AIJ grew out of international negotiations on "joint 
implementation" GI), which refers to projects from which the investor would be 
able to earn credit for redudng emissions of greenhouse gases implemented in 
another country. In addition, the Kyoto Protocol to the Convention in December 
1997 estabhshed a "clean development mechanism" (CDM) to support similar 
activities under the UNFCCC. The CDM will allow credits for certified emissions 
reductions starting in the year 2000; hence it may serve as a bridge between AIJ 
and JI. 
Objectives 
The objectives of the AIJ pohcy research project are to support South African 
stakeholders in their efforts to understand risks and opportunities of AIJ, and to 
develop strategies to manage them. Specifically, the project aims to: 
• recommend AIJ pohdes and criteria for project selection to the National 
Committee on Chmate Change; 
• recommend institutional processes and structures to support the 
recommended pohdes; 
• enhance the capadty of the AIJ Working Group and other stakeholders to 
engage in AIJ pohcy debates; 
• contribute to the NCCC' s evaluation of submitted AIJ project proposals; 
• provide analysis of lessons learned by other countries active in AIJ, and by AIJ 
investors and project developers. 
Approach 
This research brings analysis of issues raised by national and international AIJ 
pohcy debates together with the experiences of other countries and investors to 
formulate recommended AIJ pohcy and criteria. Two stakeholder workshops, 
with extensive discussions of AIJ experience in other countries and potential 
projects in South Africa, played an important role in the development of these AIJ 
pohcy recommendations. Chmate change pohcy stakeholders partidpated in the 
workshops, including members of South Africa's National Chmate Change 
Committee, AIJ project developers from business and non-government 
organisations, researchers and members of dvil sodety. The workshops aimed to 
provoke creative thinking on how to hnk concern for global chmate change with 
projects that support South African objectives for energy, environment and 
sustainable economic development. 
Recommendations for a South African programme on 
activities implemented jointly 
South Africa's current position on AIJ declares South Africa's intention to 
partidpate in the pilot phase. Although projects in the pilot phase of AIJ have 
been hmited by lack of economic and regulatory incentives, the decisions taken at 






















credits &om the year 2000 will prompt greater interest. The binding emissions 
reductions targets adopted by industrialised countries will likely mobilise billions 
of dollars over the next 50 years, and South Africa's economic and political 
circumstances could attract significant investor interest. As with all foreign 
investment, it must be managed strategically in order for the benefits to outweigh 
the costs. The recommendations in this report are designed to help South Africa 
maximise the potential benefits &om AIJ and the CDM and minimise the risks. 
The "AIJ programme" outlined below is a set of institutional structures, policies 
and procedures which can guide AIJ in South Africa. 
Mission and objectives for the South African AIJ programme 
Mission 
The mission of the South African AIJ programme should be to evaluate the local 
and global impacts, both positive and negative, of AIJ projects to determine the 
conditions for equitable and effective activities implemented jointly under the 
clean development mechanism. 
In addition, the programme should facilitate foreign investment in projects which 
support South Africa's development objectives while reducing emissions of 
greenhouse gases. 
Objectives 
The objectives of the South African AIJ programme should be to: 
• maximise participation and learning during the pilot phase; 
• promote technology transfer and capacity building; 
• formulate strategies to encourage participation by the private sector and non 
government and community based organisations; 
• contribute to methodologies for effectively measuring greenhouse gas 
emissions and sequestration. 
AIJ criteria 
The central challenge of developing national AIJ criteria is to strike an appropriate 
balance between (strong) guidance, so that projects are acceptable to the host 
country, and the flexibility to allow for innovation and broad experience. Based 
on the input &om the workshops and the review of experiences of other countries 
and project participants, EDRC recommends the following criteria for South 
Africa's programme on AIJ. 
To be found acceptable as an Activity Implemented Jointly under the pilot phase, 
a project must: 
Be compatible with and supportive of national and local priorities: 
Projects must conform with key South African policies, including the RDP, GEAR 
and CONEPP, and with policies in the relevant sectors. The project proponent 
should refer to these policies, and should consult the South African AIJ 
programme for updates/ additions to the list of relevant national policies and for 
referrals to the appropriate offices. The South African AIJ programme encourages 
projects that support South Africa's top priorities for reconstruction and 
sustainable development. Project developers are encouraged to consult with the 
South African AIJ programme co-ordinator early in the process of project 
development regarding priorities and the appropriateness of projects for AIJ 
application. 
In addition, AIJ project proposals should demonstrate that they have consulted 
with relevant local stakeholders who would be affected by the project. 
South African AIJ programme actions 
• Policies on AIJ and the (clean) Development Mechanism (CDM) should be 
integrated into proposals for South Africa's overall climate change National 
Action Plan, and should ideally be co-ordinated with other SADC countries. 




















Executive summary iii 
• The South African AIJ programme should announce preferred types of AIJ 
projects in its programme information materials. General priority areas 
should be selected from the RDP and GEAR such as low-income housing, 
public transport, or new employment opportunities. 
• The evaluators of AIJ proposals (such as the AIJ Working Group or a technical 
reference group) should also consider how to incorporate local input or 
confirm that relevant local stakeholders have been consulted on the project 
design. 
• The mitigation options identified within the Climate Change Country Study 
and National Action Plan should be separated into the following categories 
for the purpose of securing funding for implementation: 
• projects or interventions which South Africa would implement and fund 
internally; 
• projects which South Africa would implement but fund through international 
aid; 
• projects which would be feasible and desirable under the current AIJ pilot 
phase; 
• projects which would be feasible and desirable under a future JI or CDM 
framework with certified emissions reductions. 
Contribute to cost-effectiveness in achieving global and national benefits; 
AIJ activities should contribute to meeting global and national goals at the least 
cost. Not only should projects mitigate greenhouse gas emissions cost-effectively, 
they should help South Africa meet national goals, such as mass housing or 
electrification, cost-effectively given the limited resources available in South 
Africa. 
South African AIJ programme actions 
South Africa may wish to take a strategic approach to "no-regrets" or very low 
cost projects by the following approaches: 
• Pay: Charging an additional fee for the "lowest cost" emissions reductions. 
• Transfer: Requiring a transfer of technology and/ or capacity so that South 
Africa could replicate the project independently. 
• Allocate to South Africa: Negotiating to keep a higher share of quantified 
emissions reductions or certified credits from low- or negative cost reductions 
than for higher cost reductions. 
These options may only be practical after crediting becomes a reality. 
Generate reductions in emissions that are additional to any that would occur in 
the absence of the certified activity; 
The South African AIJ programme will only consider future certified reductions 
under the CDM for projects that clearly reduce emissions below "business as 
usual" . During the AIJ pilot phase, however, the programme encourages projects 
that reduce emissions of greenhouse gases and promote the objectives of the 
programme regardless of the timing or primary motivation of the project. 
South African AIJ programme actions 
• Given that the ultimate objective of AIJ is to reduce emissions and support 
sustainable development, that the objective of the pilot phase is to experiment 
with the AIJ/JI mechanism, and that there are no credits during the pilot 
phase, the South African AIJ programme should take a flexible approach to 
the additionality criterion during the pilot phase of AIJ. 
• The programme should take a more stringent approach to additionality for 
any projects submitted after the pilot phase which would acquire certified 
emissions reductions under the CDM after the year 2000. The programme 
should distinguish between activities implemented jointly (without credits) 















Executive summary iv 
and future joint implementation (with credits) or clean development projects 
that help Annex I countries meet their commitments under the Protocol. 
• South Africa should develop national emissions scenarios that could be used 
to help establish the reference cases for proposed AIJ projects. 
• Given the substantial imphcations for the amount and value of its certified 
emission reductions, South African stakeholders should play an active role in 
the debates around how to interpret and implement the Kyoto Protocol's 
requirements for emissions additionahty under the COM. 
Generate real, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of 
climate change 
Project proponents must outhne plans for monitoring and verification activities as 
required under the Convention, and for funding such activities. Monitoring plans 
should include the social, environmental and economic impacts of the project on 
the local community, in conformance with the Convention and with national 
pohcies. 
Proponents must indicate the expected temporal durability of emissions 
reductions. They should transparently outhne their assumptions and the aspects 
of the project design that will affect durability of emissions reductions. 
South African AIJ programme actions 
• The South African AIJ programme should develop a reference group of 
experts by the project type (housing, pubhc transport, industrial energy 
efficiency) to assess each proposal's estimated emissions reductions within the 
local context. 
• The South African AIJ programme should negotiate to ensure that the costs of 
monitoring and verification are not borne by South Africa, but rather by an 
international body or by the project itself. 
• The South African AIJ programme should engage in the debates around 
procedures for ensuring transparency, efficiency and accountability of 
emissions reductions through independent auditing and verification of project 
activities. The programme should draw on domestic monitoring experience 
for input to international discussions. 
• In the future, South Africa may wish to consider investing in domestic 
monitoring and/ or verification systems in order to generate South African 
Certifiable, Tradable Offsets, which could be sold under the COM after 2000. 
If receiving financing from governments, only utilise financing that is additional 
to the financial obligations of the investor country under the UNFCCC, as well as 
to current official development assistance 
Project proponents must indicate that their projects were not or would not be 
implemented with official development assistance. They should also obtain from 
the investor country government a status report, verified by the UNFCCC 
Secretariat, on the country's fulfilment of its obhgations under the UNFCCC. The 
programme will bear in mind the commitments in the Kyoto Protocol by 
industrialised country Parties to "provide new and additional financial resources 
to meet the agreed full costs ... including for the transfer of technology," needed 
by developing country Parties in complying with the Convention. 
South African AIJ programme actions 
• The AIJ programme co-ordinator should make available to the AIJ Working 
Group and proposal evaluators the status report on whether the investor 
country is meeting its financial obhgations under the convention. 
• To evaluate this criterion, the South African AIJ programme will have to 
consider carefully whether to accept projects with government funding from 
Parties that have not met all their other financial obhgations under the 






















Executive summary v 
Convention. The programme should not accept projects deemed to make 
unreasonable demands on South Africa's domestic financial resources. 
• The South African AIJ programme should engage in the debates around how 
the clean development mechanism shall assist in arranging funding of 
certified project activities, as promised in the Kyoto Protocol Article 12. 
In accordance with the Berlin Criteria, not claim any credits toward emission 
limitation obligations during the pilot phase 
Project proponents may not claim credit toward emissions limitation obhgations 
or commitments from AIJ projects in South Africa during the pilot phase. 
Project participants are encouraged to collaborate with the South African AIJ 
programme to explore potential credit sharing mechanisms which could be 
apphed under the clean development mechanism or a future joint implementation 
system, and the constraints and concerns raised by these mechanisms. Such 
explorations will contribute to South African and/ or international discussions of 
these issues, but will not automatically set a precedent for emissions crediting or 
trading. 
South African AIJ programme actions 
• The South African AIJ programme will have to develop a position on the 
Kyoto Protocol Article 12.3(b) declaration that "Parties included in Annex I [ie 
those with emissions limits] may use the certified emission reductions [under 
the CDM] . . . to contribute to comphance with part of their quantified 
emission limitation and reduction commitments" starting in 2000 (Kyoto 
Protocol 1997). The programme should seek to maximise exploration of 
potential mechanisms during the AIJ pilot phase to inform South Africa's 
positions in future negotiations. 
• The programme should be careful not to commit South Africa to any credit-
sharing arrangement prior to the establishment of rules for the CDM. 
Demonstrate transparency in aspects of project development and implementation 
that affect South Africa's other AI] criteria 
Project proponents must provide any project details on explorations of crediting, 
emissions reduction projections, technology transfer, capacity building and 
project performance monitoring to the South African AIJ programme. Project 
participants should indicate any proprietary data they wish to have protected 
under the South African AIJ programme's confidentiality agreement. 
South African AIJ programme actions 
• The programme should prepare a standard agreement to maintain 
confidentiality that any person with access to project proposals and other 
confidential project documentation would sign. The programme should 
follow the South African government's pohcies for transparency, 
confidentiality and pubhc disclosure of information. 
• If South Africa decides to conduct its own monitoring activities the 
programme should study the experience of other countries to inform 
procedures to maintain transparency concurrent with needed confidentiality. 
Contribute to building capacity and transferring sustainable and appropriate 
technology 
The South African AIJ programme encourages proposals of projects that involve 
transfer of sustainable and appropriate technology. Any transfer of technological 
hardware or operational methods should be synchronised clearly with plans to 
build capacity around that technology. 
Project proposals must document plans to. build the relevant capacity for 
successful project implementation, whether it is technical training, institutional 
development or activities to raise pubhc awareness of project issues. 



















Executive summary vi 
South African AIJ programme action 
• The South African AIJ and chmate change programmes should seek to 
synchronise acquisition of physical technology with building human resources 
and institutions. 
• After completing its Climate Change Country Study and National Action 
Plan, South Africa should apply to participate in programmes, like the US 
Technology Co-operation Frameworks project, as one avenue to technology 
transfer. 
• South Africa and its allies should develop specific, constructive negotiating 
positions regarding support for institutional AI] capacity, as well as for the 
human capacity and technology transfer components of project development. 
Identify the significant local benefits and impacts of the proposed project and 
propose plans to mitigate any negative local impacts 
In addition to identifying possible benefits and impacts, proposals must describe 
plans to mitigate any negative impacts. Project proponents should be aware that 
the South African AIJ programmes reserves the right to reject projects deemed to 
have significant negative local impacts. Monitoring plans should include 
mechanisms for assessing local impacts of the project, including stakeholder 
consultations. 
South African AIJ programme actions 
• The programme should develop mechanisms, consistent with other South 
African policies, to facilitate input from relevant local stakeholders 
throughout project design and implementation. 
• The programme should track the implementation and effectiveness of 
measures to mitigate negative impacts of projects. 
In the long ron, address the issue of sharing the economic benefits of the project's 
greenhouse gas abatement 
Because there is no crediting during the pilot phase, the economic benefits to 
investors from access to less expensive emissions reduction projects are limited. In 
the long run, however, as a crediting system is negotiated and credits have 
monetary value, South Africa will expect a fair share of any benefits associated 
with projects. Project proposals extending beyond the pilot phase should indicate 
the benefits to both parties of the project. 
South African AIJ programme actions 
• If projects are considered under an international emissions crediting system, 
such as JI or the CDM, the South African AIJ programme will need to identify 
the investor's avoided cost of emissions reductions in their home country in 
order to negotiate South Africa's fair share of the project's economic benefits. 
• Given that investors will be reluctant to share this information, the AIJ 
programme should work with the investor country governments and through 
international negotiations to establish transparent mechanisms that ensure 
developing countries receive a fair share of benefits. 
Institutional structure and process 
South Africa should integrate AIJ into policy frameworks for energy, 
environmental, foreign investment and development. The AI] programme need 
not be a new agency or separate policy infrastructure, but rather should draw on 
existing resources within and outside of government, with a co-ordinator 
managing the operations of the programme. 
The AI] Working Group 
• The AI] Working Group should initiate AIJ policy development and make 
recommendations to the NCCC and DEAT on all AIJ policy issues. 





















Executive summary vii 
• The AIJ Working Group, the NCCC and the DEAT should ensure that AIJ 
pohcy recognises and provides input to other environmental, natural resource 
and energy pohcy processes. 
• In the capacity of initiating pohcy development, as well as setting the 
direction for planning and operation of the programme, adequate stakeholder 
representation and responsiveness in the AIJ Working Group is important. 
The NCCC as a whole serves an important advisory body for stakeholder 
input on chmate change pohcy, and the AIJ Working Group must provide the 
same for AIJ and Jl issues. 
AI] planning 
The AIJ Working Group should develop Terms of Reference for the planning 
functions (eg estabhshing proposal guidehnes and evaluation procedures) and 
contract consultants to carry them out. The AIJ Working Group would review the 
consultants' work, and submit the results to the NCCC and DEAT as appropriate. 
AI] Co-ordinator 
The AIJ Working Group, in consultation with the NCCC and DEAT, should draw 
up terms of reference for an AIJ Co-ordinator to perform the day-to-day functions 
of the AIJ programme. This co-ordinator should be contracted directly to the 
DEAT, but report also to the NCCC. 
Evaluation process 
• The AIJ Co-ordinator should be available to respond to inquiries from project 
proponents regarding the appropriateness of project concepts for the AIJ 
programme. 
• Proposals should be submitted for evaluation to the AIJ Working Group 
through the AIJ Co-ordinator 
• The AIJ Working Group should c;levelop a technical reference group of experts 
willing and able to review AIJ proposals for the environmental and social 
impacts, but not their financial viability (which is up to the project 
developers). This group could include other members of the NCCC. 
• Since South Africa's AIJ criteria will cover a range of technical, social and 
economic issues, the AIJ Working Group should invite experts in the project 
type (housing, pubhc transport, industrial energy efficiency) to evaluate the 
project proposal within the local context. 
Funding the AI] programme 
The NCCC should recommend co-operation with other host countries to negotiate 
for fulfilment of the Kyo to commitments for the Clean Development Mechanism 
(COM). The AIJ Working Group and NCCC should collaborate with other African 
countries to analyse the options for allocating funds from the COM to defray 
administrative expenses under Article 12.8 of the Kyoto Protocol, and develop 
joint negotiating positions. 
Conclusion 
South Africa has a· window of opportunity to learn from its own and other 
countries' experience with the pilot phase so far, and to play an active role in 
shaping the post-2000 emissions crediting regimes. There are sufficiently large 
potential benefits and risks from AIJ and the new clean development mechanism 
to warrant a well-organised institutional approach of co-ordinated governmental 
and non-governmental activities. The recommendations presented here can lay 
the groundwork for an effective, transparent, and flexible AIJ programme. 
Experience from this programme will be a crucial input to South Africa's future 
positions on emissions trading and broader chmate change pohcy. 
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1.1 Activities implemented jointly 
"Activities implemented jointly" is the name given to projects or pohcies 
undertaken collaboratively among countries to mitigate the threat of global 
chmate change. Projects can be implemented in a variety of sectors: housing, 
industry, commercial, transport, forestry, sohd waste and agriculture. 
The term "activities implemented jointly" derives from the term "joint 
implementation," which was drawn from the text of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Chmate Change (UNFCCC). Article 4.2 of the 
UNFCCC allows signatories to "implement ... pohcies and measures jointly" with 
other signatories to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases: 
Article 4.2 of the UN Framework Convention on Oimate Change: 
... The developed country Parties and other Parties included in Annex I 
commit themselves specifically as provided for in the following: 
(a) .... Each of these Parties shall adopt national pohcies and take 
corresponding measures on the mitigation of chmate change ... 
These Parties may implement such pohcies and measures jointly with other 
Parties and may assist other Parties in contributing to the achievement of 
the objective of the Convention ... 
Negotiators began referring to the mechanism as "joint implementation," or Jl, 
and interpreted the phrase to mean that the investing party could get credit 
against its emission reduction obligations from a project undertaken in a "host 
country," which was usually assumed to be a developing country or country with 
an economy in transition to a market economy. 
1. 1.1 Economic basis 
Economists offered their analysis of Jl based on principles of environmental 
economics that suggest costs of abating pollution can be minimised by taking 
advantage of the least cost abatement opportunities first. If indeed the marginal 
cost of abatement was lower in a host country than an investor country, then there 
should be economic gains from reducing emissions in the host country rather than 
the investor country (see Figure 1). Greenhouse gases mix in the atmosphere, so 
emissions can be cut anywhere and have the same affect on chmate change. This 
fact allows the international chmate change regime to separate responsibility for 
reducing emissions, which rests on the industrialised countries, from the 

















Figure 2 shows the theoretical gains from Jl between two hypothetical countries. 
The investor country must reduce its emissions from the left axis to the right axis. 
The width of the graph represents the total target reductions for the investor 
country. The cost to the investor country, if it were forced to meet its target 
exclusively by reducing emissions domestically, is reflected in the area under its 
marginal cost of abatement curve A-B-D. 
The cost of emissions reductions in the host country, which has no emissions 
reduction target, is reflected in area under its marginal cost of abatement curve C-
B-E. Note that, for the investor country, emissions reductions increase moving 
from the left to the right, while for the host country emissions reductions increase 
moving from the right to the left. The overall cost of the meeting the investor 
country's target could be minimised by reducing emissions in the investor country 
from point 0 up to the point H, and in the host country from the H to point T, the 
target. The total cost of reducing emissions up to the target under Jl is therefore 
the area under A-B-C, so the triangle C-B-D represents the potential monetary 
savings from JI. The investor and host countries could spht the savings through 














Figure 2. Reducing the cost of emissions abatement through Jl- a dynamic view 
Industrialised countries with commitments to reduce emissions recognised in Jl a 
way to cut costs by earning credits in countries with less expensive emissions 
reduction opportunities. The World Bank estimated that international carbon 
emission reduction regulations requiring nations to make all emissions reductions 
within their own borders could cost $250 bilhon a year by 2010. The Bank 
calculated that achieving the same emission reductions through global offset 
trading could cost only $80 bilhon a year (World Bank 1996). 
1. 1.2 A pilot phase 
Many countries were uncomfortable with allowing credits under Jl before the 
mechanism had been adequately tested, and others had serious doubts about the 
global equity and justice of the J1 concept overall. At their first session in Berhn, 
the Conference of the Parties to the Convention negotiated a compromise, and 
estabhshed a pilot phase for "activities implemented jointly" which would allow 
co-operative efforts among countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
Significantly, no credits for emissions reductions were to be allowed during the 
AI] pilot phase. The Parties agreed to evaluate the pilot phase and its rules no 
later than 2000. 























CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES 
First session 
Berlin, 28 March - 7 April1995 
Decision 5/CP.l 
Activities implemented jointly under the pilot phase 
The Conference of the Parties: 
. . . Noting that the largest share of historical and current global emissions of 
greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries, that per capita emissions 
in developing countries are still relatively low and that the share of global 
emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet their social and 
development needs, .. . 
Recognising that ... 
Activities implemented jointly under the Convention are supplemental, and 
should only be treated as a subsidiary means of achieving the objective of the 
Convention, 
Activities implemented jointly in no way modify the commitments of each Party 








To establish a pilot phase for activities implemented jointly amongst 
Annex I Parties and, on a voluntary basis, with non-Annex I Parties that 
so request; 
That activities implemented jointly should be compatible with and 
supportive of national environment and development priorities and 
strategies, contribute to cost-effectiveness in achieving global benefits and 
could be conducted in a comprehensive manner covering all relevant 
sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases; 
That all activities implemented jointly under this pilot phase require prior 
acceptance, approval or endorsement by the Governments of the Parties 
participating in these activities; 
That activities implemented jointly should bring about real, measurable 
and long-term environmental benefits related to the mitigation of climate 
change that would not have occurred in the absence of such activities; 
That the financing of activities implemented jointly shall be additional to 
the financial obligations of the Parties... as well as to current official 
development assistance; 
That no credits shall accrue to any Party as a result of greenhouse gas 
emissions reduced or sequestered during the pilot phase from activities 
implemented jointly. 
1 .2 Research objectives 
1.2.1 Goal 
The EDRC AIJ Policy Research Project has sought to facilitate South Africa's 
efforts to develop policy on AIJ and evaluate potential projects. 
1.2.2 Objectives 
The objectives of the AIJ Policy Research Project are to support South African 
stakeholders in their efforts to understand the risks and opportunities of AIJ, and 
to develop strategies to manage them. Specifically, the project aims to do the 
following: 
• Recommend AIJ policies and criteria for- project selection to the National 
Committee on Climate Change. 




















• Recommend institutional processes and structures to support the 
recommended policies. 
• Enhance the capacity of the AIJ Working Group and other stakeholders to 
engage in AIJ policy debates. 
• Contribute to the NCCC' s evaluation of submitted AIJ project proposals. 
• Provide analysis of lessons learned by other countries active in AIJ, and by AIJ 
investors and project developers. 
Figure 3 illustrates how the project sought to meet its objectives by soliciting input 
from, and providing information to, South African stakeholders, government 
















Figure 3. Institutional context for AIJ policy research project 
1 .3 Research methodology 
1.3.1 Genesis of the project 
The AIJ research project was conceptualised in 1995 in discussions between Jessica 
Hirst, a postgraduate student in the Energy and Resources Group at the 
University of California at Berkeley, and Anton Eberhard and Clive van Horen of 
the Energy and Development Research Centre at the University of Cape Town. 
They recognised that while climate change and A1J would become significant 
issues for South Africa, there was little capacity or even awareness around the 
issue. Some of the reasons for the EDRC's interest included: 
• Vulnerability. South Africa is vulnerable to the damaging impacts of climate 
change, which could include extreme and unstable weather patterns. For 
example, areas like the Transvaal could receive increased amounts of rain, 
leading to flooding, while others, like the Karoo, could experience a longer 
dry season leading to increased desertification (IPCC 1997). 
• Investor interest. There is growing interest from the private sector in 
industrialised countries in investing in local projects on AIJ. South African 
parties in all sectors may be approached regarding participation in AIJ 
projects, and hence may wish to develop strategies based on a greater 
understanding of the issues involved. For example, NGOs could take the 
initiative to develop AIJ projects in line with the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP). 









• International involvement. Many countries are expecting South Africa to 
assume a leading role in the implementation of AIJ in Africa. Affected parties 
may wish to participate in the development of South Africa's position on AIJ 
in international negotiations. 
Ms Hirst had worked on the United States Initiative on Joint Implementation and 
had become concerned with how difficult it was for host countries to get access to 
resources to build their own capacity around AIJ pohcy. Hirst and Van Horen 
developed a proposal for an AIJ pohcy research project that would involve South 
African stakeholders developing a knowledge base around AIJ, analysing case 
studies, and considering pohcy strategies. They circulated the proposal to a broad 
range of funders in South Africa, the United States and Norway. The South 
African Human Sciences Research Council programme on Global Change and 
Social Transformation, Eskom and the US-South Africa Binational Commission, 
through funding from the US Agency for International Development, agreed to 
support the project. 
1.3.2 Approach 
This research brings together analysis of issues raised by national and 
international AIJ pohcy debates with the experience of other countries and 
investors in formulating AIJ pohcy and criteria. (see Figure 4). Two stakeholder 
workshops, with extensive discussions of AIJ experience in other countries and 
potential projects in South Africa, played an important role in the development of 
these AIJ pohcy recommendations. Chmate change pohcy stakeholders 
participated in the workshops, including members of South Africa's National 
Chmate Change Committee, AIJ project developers from business and non-
government organisations and interested researchers and members of civil 
society. The workshops aimed to provoke creative thinking on how to hnk 
concern for global climate change with projects that support South African 
objectives for energy, environment and sustainable economic development. 





Figure 4. Policy research project approach 
1.3.2.1 Initial workshop 
The initial workshop, held on 5 November 1997 in Cape Town at EDRC, 
presented the international and national pohcy context, illustrations from other 
developing countries involved in AIJ and from investors and project developers. 
Workshop participants discussed the AIJ pilot phase criteria established at the 
first Conference of the Parties in Berhn (the "Berhn Criteria"), as well as South 
Africa's current position on AIJ. The workshop also sohcited input on priorities 
for AIJ project selection criteria and instituti9ns, and regarding parameters for 
analysing the case studies. 























The EDRC researchers synthesised the input made at the first workshop into a list 
of key issues to address at the second workshop. The research team prepared a 
worksheet for each issue that included the definition of the issue, illustrations 
from the experience of other countries, illustrations from proposed South Africa 
AIJ projects, and questions for discussion. The chapter of this report on issues and 
criteria follows directly from the workshop format. 
1.3.2.3 Illustrations from South Africa 
The illustrations of potential South African AIJ projects, drawn from actual 
proposals under development, were designed to clarify the practical aspects of the 
issues in the South Africa context and to facilitate discussion on how to manage 
the risks and opportunities from AIJ projects. In consultation with the South 
African AIJ Working Group, a sub-committee of the National Committee on 
Climate Change, EDRC selected case studies in transport, industrial energy 
efficiency, residential energy efficiency and small-scale renewable energy. 
1.3.2.4 Second workshop 
The second workshop, held on 24 November 1997, at the Minerals and Energy 
Policy Centre in Johannesburg, included presentations of the South Africa case 
studies by the project developers. Workshop participants discussed the 
illustration presented in the worksheets, criteria for project selection and possible 
institutional structures (that is, institutions responsible and the process of 
evaluation). 
1.3.3 Why this approach? 
Stakeholder consultation is an integral component of developing policy in post-
apartheid South Africa. The South African government demonstrated that it 
would not make climate change policy decisions without due consideration; it 
delayed ratification of the Framework Convention on Climate Change for three 
years pending stakeholder consultations and analysis of the implications of 
ratification. 
1.3.4 Methodology assessment 
1.3.4.1 Addressing the "information vacuum" 
The workshops began to address the "information vacuum" lamented by African 
AIJ stakeholders, and to move AIJ discussion from the abstract to the practical 
(Maya and Gupta 1996. As South Africa's experience with the ratification of the 
UNFCCC demonstrated, building capacity to develop policy around complex 
issues is challenging. Non-government organisations in particular have suffered 
from a lack of adequate resources to build capacity around climate change, or 
even to understand why it is a relevant issue. Longer-term efforts are needed to 
build the capacity of civil society and the private sector to engage in the policy 
development process and to develop successful AIJ projects. 
1.3.4.2 Encouraging broader stakeholder participation 
Although the NCCC was established as a forum for stakeholder input and 
interaction, the EDRC research project found that some key stakeholders groups 
lacked the capacity to participate effectively. Non-government organisations, 
provincial government, and small business have been scarcely represented, due to 
lack of human and financial resources. Some stakeholders reported that NCCC 
was not taking the steps needed to facilitate meaningful participation by 
stakeholders lacking the resources to develop capacity independently. Lack of 
attention to participation and local institutional capacity was found to be the main 
cause of failure for World Bank projects, which share some foreign-funded 
"development" qualities with AIJ projects (Zazueta 1995). The two NGO members 
of the NCCC were both leaving the committee to work on other issues as the 
EDRC project began, creating difficulties because no replacements had been 
identified. 






















1.3.4.3 Contributing to transparency and legitimacy 
The project approach has contributed to the transparent, legitimate AIJ policy 
development and project evaluation process. For AIJ or Jl to attract investment in 
sustainable development, carbon credits must have value, which in turn means 
that host country acceptance must have enduring validity. At least one USIJI 
project accepted outside of a national host country Jl programme has already had 
its acceptance challenged, and other projects accepted by an ad-hoc process may 
experience similar difficulties when the process changes. Institutional capacity, as 
would be created in a national programme or policy framework, will reduce these 
risks. 











2. Policy context 
2.1 International policy context: the Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol is a legally binding instrument to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It was adopted at the 
third session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the Convention in Kyoto, 
Japan, on 10 December 1997 (Conference of the Parties 1997). The Protocol was 
negotiated pursuant to the Berlin Mandate, adopted at the first session of the 
COP, which called for a legally binding instrument to further the Convention's 
ultimate objective, to prevent catastrophic human-induced climate change 
(Conference of the Parties 1995). The Appendix contains a timeline of major 
events in the evolution of AIJ, "The Road from Rio to Kyoto" Uoint Implementation 
Quarterly 1997). 
2.1.1 Commitments 
Article 10 of the Protocol declares that all Parties shall: 
• maintain inventories of anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 
sources and removal by sinks; 
• formulate and implement plans to mitigate and adapt to climate change 
• promote technology transfer; 
• collect data on climatic changes and impacts; 
• co-operate to strengthen human and institutional capacity and facilitate public 
awareness; and 
• communicate progress to the UNFCCC secretariat. 
• (Conference of the Parties 1997) 
2.1.1.1 Developing country participation 
The Protocol reaffirms the common but differentiated responsibilities of the 
Parties, but does not introduce any new commitments for developing countries. 
The language that would have provided a "voluntary opt-in" for developing 
countries to commit to their own emission targets and timetables, Article 10 in the 
draft Protocol, was removed during the final session at the insistence of the Group 
of 77 and China.t The South African delegation was disappointed that the 
language removed, as they thought developing countries should be allowed to 
make voluntary commitments to reduce emissions. They were also concerned that 
the exclusion of Article 10 would hinder US ratification of the Protocol (Weather 
Bureau, DEAT, 1998). 
The "voluntary opt-in" language was meant largely to assure the US Congress of 
meaningful participation by developing countries, a condition for ratification 
imposed by the US Senate. The removal of the language throws US Senate 
ratification into further uncertainty (US Climate Action Network, 1997). 
Annie Petsonk, International Counsel for the Environmental Defense Fund, 
pointed out that a clause adopted at the last moment provides another way for 
developing nations to voluntarily join the Protocol through a simple amendment 
to the list of participants (US Climate Action Network 1997). 
2.1.1.2 Emissions Trading and A.IJ//1 
Decision 5/CP.1 of the first meeting of the COP established the pilot phase of AIJ 
and laid out its ground rules (Conference of the Parties 1995). The Kyoto Protocol 
updated those decisions by adopting language on emissions trading and joint 
implementation (Conference of the Parties 1997). The US Climate Action 
Network's "Citizen Update" of 19 December 1997 contained the following 
summary of the agreements: 
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The US succeeded - just barely - in convincing other nations to accept the 
principle of international trading of emission reduction credits. Detailed 
rules for just how such a trading system will work were not set in Kyo to; 
this will be a major agenda item for the fourth meeting of the Conference of 
the Parties, in Buenos Aires, Argentina, next November. Article 16 bis 
allows emissions trading "supplemental to domestic actions" and limited to 
those countries taking on binding emissions limits, which at this stage are 
the industrialised countries and countries with economies in transition to 
market economies. 
The "joint implementation" idea of allowing emiSsions credits for 
investments in developing countries that have not yet taken on binding 
commitments was converted into a "Clean Development Mechanism." This 
provides a clearinghouse through which countries or companies can make 
investments in sustainable development projects in developing countries in 
return for emission credits which can be used to comply with their 
obhgations. Use of this mechanism, which will be supervised by the FCCC, 
will only start after further review and establishment of verification 
procedures, but the Protocol allows "certified emissions reductions" after 
2000 to be used to achieve comphance in the 2008-2012 commitment period. 
Private sector and other non-government entities may participate in the 
Clean Development Mechanism and may acquire certified credits. 
In summary, the Kyo to Protocol allows for emissions trading among countries 
with binding commitments, and for emissions reduction credits &om developing 
countries after 2000. 
2.1.1.3 General summary of developing countries and countries with economies 
in transition 
The Appendix contains a list of AIJ projects reported to the UNFCCC Secretariat. 
The list reveals that the majority of AIJ projects so far are in Central America and 
Eastern Europe; few are in Asian Countries (only Indonesia and Bhutan), and only 
one is in Africa (Burkina Paso). Other AIJ projects are in development, but have 
not yet been reported to the UNFCCC. A project must be accepted, approved or 
endorsed officially by the governments of the partner countries before the 
UNFCCC may list it as an AIJ project. Figure 5 shows the African countries with 
projects reported to the UNFCCC (Burkina Paso) and with other activities 
(projects, proposals, concepts, etc) related to AIJ. Most of the AIJ projects are in 
energy and forestry (reforestation, afforestation and preservation), with only one 
in agriculture and none in transport (CC:INFO/ AIJ1997a). 

























• Countries with UNFCC 
reported projects 
- solar water 
heater, PV 
Figure 5. African countries with AIJ projects or other activities reported to 
the UNFCCC 
2.2 African perspectives on AIJ 
2.2. 1 Summary of African positions and concerns on AIJ 
10 
African positions on AIJ and JI have evolved as participants in the debate build 
the knowledge base required to perform their own analyses of the potential risks 
and opportunities. The Southern Centre for Energy and Environment, based in 






Joint Implementation: Cautions and Options for the South 
AIJ: Africans in Jeopardy? 
Strategic Approach to Joint Implementation: Perspectives for 
Developing Countries. 
Joint Implementation: Carbon Colonies or Business 
Opportunities? 
The series of publications traces the debate from its early stage of almost outright 
rejection in the name of fighting environmental imperialism, to reluctant 
acceptance, to recognition that AIJ and JI might offer Africa some beneficial 
opportunities, provided sufficient support to build capacity and a savvy business 
perspective. 
African caution regarding AIJ and JI is grounded in the continent's experience 
with colonisation and continuing exploitation by the North. Peter Zhou of 
Botswana expressed the general fear that JI is a "Trojan horse", promoted by the 
North for its technological benefits, but actually a ploy to extend exploitation of 
cheap labour and natural resources (Maya & Gupta 1996). The authors of Joint 
implementation: Carbon colonies or business opportunities, a group of African climate 
change policy stakeholders, did not recommend rejecting AIJ, but rather called for 
action to raise awareness, develop legitimate policy and institutional frameworks, 
and build capacity to negotiate good deals (Maya & Gupta 1996). They said that 
African negotiators needed to develop the ability to assess the motives and 
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proposals of prospective AIJ investors and Northern governments in order to 
move from posturing to bargaining and "induced" to "restricted" acceptance. 
South Africa was one of the developing countries interested in the possibility of JI 
early in the negotiations on the Framework Convention, although that position 
was taken under the previous government. Tanzania, in its prominent role as 
leader of the G-77 and China, has frequently voiced opposition and concern 
regarding the implications of JI. In the meetings leading up to the third session of 
the COP in Kyoto, Tanzania presented a G-77 /China position that called for a 
Compensation Fund to minimise adverse impacts on developing countries of 
climate change and of activities to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (Earth 
Negotiations Bulletin (ENB) 1997). The G-77 and China further proposed a Clean 
Development Fund to assist developing country Parties in complying with the 
Convention and pursuing sustainable development. Similarly, Zimbabwean 
delegates are often on record as championing equity and assistance on behalf of 
the African Group of countries (Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB) 1997). 
2.2.2 Time line of major events 
The series of African AIJ milestones described below does not represent a linear 
progression of increasing capacity to address AIJ issues. Rather, the workshops 
have exposed different groups around Africa to the AIJ concept. To date, a small 
group of Africans has developed sophisticated positions on AI], and these experts 
have been often invited to represent the "African" view on JI to the international 
community. Participants in the workshops below have remarked on the need for 
increased support to improve capacity in African governments, as well as in the 
African NGO and business communities to deal with JI issues and broaden the 
debate on JI. 
1994 Climate and Africa Project and the African Conference on Policy Options 
and Responses to Climate Change 
The Climate and Africa Project addressed joint implementation among other 
climate change issues and was co-ordinated by the Stockholm Environment 
Institute and the African Centre for Technology Studies. The Conference was held 
in Nairobi, Kenya in December 1994, and was co-sponsored by the United States 
Initiative on Joint Implementation (Silveira, 1994). 
1995 First Conference of the Parties, Berlin 
The Institute of Environmental Studies of the Free University, Amsterdam, and 
the Southern Centre for Energy and Environment of Harare, Zimbabwe held a 
joint workshop to discuss joint implementation (Maya and Gupta 1996). 
1995 Kadoma workshop and statement 
Held in Kadoma, Zimbabwe, by the Southern Centre for Energy and Environment 
and the Institute of Environment Studies, Amsterdam, the Kadoma workshop 
represented the culmination of a project that assessed JI possibilities in six African 
countries: Botswana, Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
(Maya & Gupta 1996). The project was funded by the Netherlands Ministry of 
Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment. The workshop produced a statement 
on JI as well as a collaborative book entitled Joint implementation: Carbon colonies or 
business opportunities? Weighing the odds in an information vacuum. The book 
concludes that Africa's ability to negotiate for and assess benefits from JI remains 
limited. The stakeholders consulted generally agreed that "Africa should take a 
strategic approach to JI and assess the benefits rather that lament the risks" (Maya 
and Gupta 1996). 
1995 South Africa signs Statement of Intent with the United States 
The South African and US energy ministers signed a bilateral statement of intent 
to co-operate in mitigating the threat of climate change and promoting sustainable 
development in December 1995, at the first meeting of the South Africa-US 
Binational Commission (US Department of Energy, 1995). South African NGOs 
have expressed concern that this statement was signed without adequate 
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consultation, prior to the formation of a national policy on climate change, and 
under significant pressure from the United States. Partly for these reasons, the 
statement does not refer by name to "activities implemented jointly", although the 
text describes co-operation on projects to reduce emissions of greenhouse gasses. 
1996 Fonnation of South African National Committee on Climate Change 
The South African NCCC was formed in August 1996, under the direction of the 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT). The NCCC's first 
task was to generate support to ratify the UN Framework Conventional Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). The committee is an informal advisory body for the DEA T 
and so has no formal policy-making authority. NCCC members come from across 
the sectors: government, industry, NGOs and academia. 
1997 South African Workshop on Country Studies and AI] 
The US Country Studies Program held a workshop in March 1997 to launch the 
South African climate change Country Study. The US Initiative on Jl held a one-
day workshop to share information and discuss opportunities for AIJ in South 
Africa Ooint Implementation Quarterly 1997). 
1997 Regional workshop on AI] in Burkina Faso 
The World Bank's Global Climate Change Unit held a workshop in February 1997, 
as part of its AIJ Work Program. The Bank's AIJ Work Program and its pilot 
projects are being funded by the Government of Norway. The program is working 
with the Government of Burkina Faso to develop both a renewable energy project 
and an integrated travel demand management project. 
1997 Cairo workshop 
The governments of Egypt, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the United 
States sponsored a regional workshop in AIJ in Cairo on 4-8 July 1997. Workshop 
participants from 25 countries called for additional support from donors and 
NGO's to build African capacity around AIJ (Fecher, R 1997). In lamenting the 
relatively small number of AIJ projects in Africa, participants proposed that the 
Kyoto meeting of the Parties "should establish parameters for a mutually 
beneficial incentive structure ... in order to facilitate investment flows to all 
interested Parties" UIQ, September 1997). 
1997 Kenya workshop 
This regional workshop on AIJ was convened in November 1997 by Climate 
Network Africa, a network of African NGOs. The participants, most of whom 
were from the private sector, concluded that Africa is not against AIJ, and that 
Africans should get more involved in the process right away in order to benefit 
from the learning experience in the pilot phase (Weather Bureau 1998). 
2.3 AIJ in South Africa 
2.3. 1 AIJ Working Group of the NCCC 
The AIJ Working Group of the NCCC was formed in 1996 as an interim body to 
consider AIJ policy questions and project proposals, disseminate information to 
the relevant government and private sector stakeholders, and to make 
recommendations to the NCCC. The DEAT, which chairs the NCCC, is 
responsible for authorising AIJ projects in co-ordination with other departments, 
such as Trade and Industry, and Minerals and Energy (DEAT 1996). The Working 
Group members all serve on a part-time basis, and include representatives from 
the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism's Weather Bureau, the 
Department of Minerals of Energy, Eskom and the Chamber of Mines. EDRC was 
also part of the group until September, 1997. The Appendix contains the terms of 
reference for the AIJ Working Group. 
2.3.2 Approved Projects 
The AIJ Working Group recommended that the NCCC accept two proposed pilot 
projects in sustainable housing. The Netherlands and the United States are the 
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investor countries. In addition, the Working Group has approved in principle the 
project between Iscor and Hoogovens (Weather Bureau 1998). 
2.3.3 South Africa's current AIJ position 
The current position was developed by the pohtical delegation to Berhn in 1995 in 
consultation with other African countries. The NCCC and DEA T adopted the 
position with minor modifications. The NCCC has emphasised that South Africa's 
official pohcy on AIJ will be developed as part of the chmate change White Paper 
process. The current position is therefore subject to further modification, but is 
being used to guide decisions on the proposals already submitted to the AIJ 
Working Group (Weather Bureau 1998). 
The position is consistent with the Berhn Criteria, with some additional 
conditions:2 
• transparency (no other country's criteria mentions this); 
• effective measurement of costs and benefits; 
• capacity building to judge Jl concept (no other country mentions this) . 
• (DEAT1996 
• the position notes that it apphes only to AIJ, and that a position on Jl with 
credits will be developed in due course; 
See the Appendix for the full text of the position. 














3. AIJ investor objectives and motivations 
3.1 Private sector interest in joint implementation 
Corporate interest in JI and emissions trading arises primarily from the desire to 
minimise the cost of meeting climate change commitments. Firms that emit carbon 
dioxide, methane or other greenhouse gases may also recognise potential business 
opportunities in JI. JI could facilitate access to new markets, both geographically 
and for innovative technologies. In addition, some business executives may wish 
to contribute to sustainable development and build an image of a responsible 
global citizen, either as a personal commitment or as part of a corporate social 
responsibility programme (Trexler and Associates 1997). 
Support for Jl and emissions trading is rationalised through the economic 
principle of equalising the marginal cost of abating emissions of greenhouse gases 
across all sources (and sinks). This principle surmises that there are opportunities 
to reduce emissions in developing countries and countries with economies in 
transition that cost less per ton of gases than opportunities in their own facilities 
or countries. For example, Japan may find it extremely expensive to reduce 
emissions domestically, because its economy is already more energy-efficient than 
other industrialised countries. 
Investor concerns 
Most of the challenges of financing AIJ projects are not unique to AI]. The same 
obstacles challenge any overseas or "unconventional" project- that is, projects in 
renewable energy, energy efficiency, sustainable land use, forest conservation, etc. 
These projects are considered "unconventional" because they not familiar to and 
accepted by mainstream sources of financing. Although supporters of AIJ had 
hoped AIJ status would help unconventional projects obtain financing, project 
developers have found that the uncertainties of the pilot phase sometimes pose 
obstacles to financing. The evolving nature of the pilot phase is at odds with 
financiers' demands for low risk and predictable returns. Usually, higher risk 
demands higher returns. AIJ projects, by focusing on longer-term and less easily 
monetised benefits, do not always produce the high short-term returns favoured 
by conventional investors. When the international community moves into a more 
mature phase of joint implementation or emissions trading, and establishes rules 
for measuring and monetising greenhouse gas emissions credits and debits, AIJ 
projects will start to realise financial advantages. 
3.1.1 Hurdles for overseas projects 
Any project developed outside the home country faces challenges on the road to 
success, including the following: 
3.1.1.1 Establishing a presence 
A company must make a significant investment in learning how to do business in 
another country before earning any new income. The company must become 
familiar with the country's business rules and customs, and build relationships 
with prospective partners, suppliers, customers and government officials. The 
start-up costs for establishing a presence can be a barrier to smaller firms, though 
a firm can reduce costs by working closely with in-country partners from the 
beginning (Abuehl, C 1997 and Shiflett, R 1997). 
3.1.1.2 Uncertain or cumbersome regulations 
Although regulations can be unclear or cumbersome in any country, they are 
more likely to be in a state of flux in countries with quickly developing economies 
or frequently changing governments. For example, Guatemala passed 
environmental legislation several years ago, but did not develop the 
implementing regulatory infrastructure. Investors were left wondering what was 
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submitted. Guatemala's development of legislation for private power projects also 
took several years, during which time much project development had to be 
suspended due to the uncertain regulatory environment (US Export Council for 
Renewable Energy 1996). 
3.1.1.3 Exchange risk 
Fluctuating currencies are more and more of an everyday hazard, as economies 
globalise. Loans or other expenses may be denominated in one currency, such as 
dollars, while project income is denominated in the local currency (Shiflett, R 
1997). If the local currency loses value, the project developer will not be able to 
service the loan or pay supphers. 
3.1.1.4 Restricted repatriation of profits 
Some countries restrict the amount of local currency than can leave the country, or 
put an artificial cap on the rate of return an investor may recover. Such 
restrictions may make sense from the host country's perspective, but they pose 
problems for investors, whose returns are measured in their home countries 
(Shiflett, R 1997). 
3.1.1.5 Bureaucratic delays 
Host countries' governments are often understaffed, and hence cannot make 
decisions quickly (Abuehl, C 1997 and Shiflett, R 1997). Large companies with 
many investment opportunities often require quick decisions in order to maximise 
their returns, and every day of delay imposes opportunity costs. 
3. 1.2 Additional hurdles for "unconventional" projects 
Projects that feature technologies or methods that deviate from business as usual, 
including most AIJ projects, confront additional barriers: 
3.1.2.1 Difficulty of financing small projects 
The cost of analysing a project's financial viability varies httle with project size, so 
banks and other sources of finance prefer larger projects because the costs of 
analysis are a smaller portion of the total project costs. A lawyer involved in 
financing AI] projects graphically demonstrated the transaction cost problem by 
holding up two hardbound volumes of legal project financing documents. One 
was for a small financing of a few million dollars, the other for a large financing of 
$100 million; both volumes were the same size (Johnson 1996). The bias against 
small projects works against most renewable energy and energy efficiency 
projects because they tend to be smaller than fossil fuel or large hydropower 
projects. For instance, multilateral development banks often will not consider 
projects smaller than 15 megawatts. 
One illustration of this effect on AIJ projects is the financing search for a fuel-
switch in the city of Decin, the Czech Repubhc (Centre for Oean Air Pohcy 1995). 
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) is the part of the World Bank which 
provides financing to private entities. The developers of the Decin project met 
with the Prague-based representative, and learned that the IFC was not a good 
source of financing for the following reasons (Center for Oean Air Pohcy 1995): 
• All IFC projects must be at least 51% private sector owned. The Decin project 
was being developed as a joint stock company, but was to be virtually 100 per 
cent owned by the City of Decin. 
• The amount of capital sought was too small. The IFC prefers projects that 
borrow over $5 million. 
• The required backing of the IFC loan by a Czech bank would make it too 
expensive. Before agreeing to back the loan, the Czech bank must conduct due 
diligence for the project. After adding on the Czech bank's percentage fee, 
charged to cover the costs of evaluating the project's financial viability, the 
project developer might have lost the advantage afforded by the IFC's lower-
than-standard rates. 









AIJ investor objectives and motivations 16 
• The City of Decin would assume too much currency risk, since the loan would 
be denominated in US dollars. 
3.1.2.2 Higher up-front capital costs, lower operating costs 
Relative to a conventional fossil-fuel project, the capital costs of a renewable 
energy project are concentrated in the earher stages of the project, when the wind 
turbines or solar cells are purchased. A renewable energy project usually has 
much lower operating costs than a fossil-fuel project, because wind and sunshine 
are free fuels, while coal and fuel oil are not (Abuehl, C 1997 and Shiflett, R 1997). 
3.1.2. 3 Apparently lower returns 
The benefits of conventional projects, such as electric power, process heat or 
lumber, are highly valued in the market place, while the negative impacts, such as 
pollution or degraded lands, tend to be imposed on others and hence are external 
to project financial analyses. The additional benefits of unconventional projects, 
such as cleaner air, cleaner water and healthier natural resources, tend to be 
poorly valued in the market place. External costs and benefits form the basis of 
environmental economics, the study of which helps explain why unconventional 
projects appear to have a lower return on investment than conventional projects. 
(Abuehl, C 1997 and Shiflett, R 1997). 
3.1.2.4 Financiers' preference for familiar technologies 
Financing institutions tend to be risk-averse, because they must ensure that the loans 
they make are repaid. They also have to minimise the amount of resources they invest 
in evaluating project risks. For both these reasons they tend to prefer familiar 
technologies and methods such as coal-fired boilers, internal combustion engines and 
rapid turnover of forestry stocks. Unconventional projects are less familiar, and hence 
perceived as more risky (Abuehl, C 1997). 
3.1.2.5 Government reluctance to evaluate and oversee unconventional projects 
Some governments do not yet have the institutional capability to evaluate and 
administer unconventional projects. A Central American parastatal electric utility 
recently postponed development of several privately developed geothermal power 
projects, citing lack of experience with administering the technology (ICE, 1995). The 
energy sectors in many countries are currently undergoing restructuring, which in the 
short term dampens development activities. Restructuring, however, could present an 
opportunity to increase development of cleaner and more sustainable projects. 
3.1 .3 Hurdles specific to AIJ projects 
The hurdles specific to AIJ projects will be addressed in greater detail in subsequent 
chapters. 
3.1.3.1 Higher transaction costs 
AIJ projects have additional transaction costs associated with interacting with 
home and host country governments, estimating emissions reductions, 
monitoring and following developments in international climate change pohcy. 
These costs will probably diminish as AIJ experience grows, but for the time being 
they are a serious consideration Gohnson, B 1997 and Abuehl, C 1997). 
3.1.3.2 Uncertain legitimacy of host country acceptance 
During the pilot phase many host countries are responding to AIJ project 
proposals in an ad-hoc fashion, which engenders uncertainty for investors. 
Without a formal framework they cannot be sure that the acceptance will be 
honoured in future AIJ, JI or trading emissions systems (Bittle-Koenick, M 1997, 
Johnson, B 1997 and Shiflett, R 1997). 
3.1.3.3 No crediting 
Crediting is the lynchpin of the Joint Implementation concept. A quantified credit 
for reducing emissions of greenhouse gases, if valued in the market place, could 
significantly affect investment decisions. Crediting is needed to give carbon offsets 
commercial monetary value (Abuehl, Chris 1997 and Bittle-Koenick, M 1997, 
Johnson, B 1997 and Shiflett, R 1997). 
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3.1.3.4 Uncertain durability of emission reductions 
An AIJ investor's return has both finandal and environmental (i.e. erruss10ns 
reduction) components. If a project fails completely, or fails to reduce emissions as 
expected, the investor loses those environmental as well as finandal returns 
(Bittle-Koenick, M 1997 and Shiflett, R 1997). 
3.1.3.5 Quantifiability of emission reductions 
Developing methods for measuring emissions reductions is one of the goals of the 
pilot phase and, as such, project developers must deal with uncertainty regarding 
the amount of emissions reduced. They must also grapple with changing 
requirements for monitoring and verification (Bittle-Koenick, M 1997 and 
Johnson, B 1997 and Shiflett, R 1997). 
3.2 Investor experience in the pilot phase 
The AIJ pilot phase has had mixed success in addressing the investor concerns 
mentioned above. Investors in several countries have found AIJ projects 
particularly complex and difficult to fund and implement. Examples from Costa 
Rica and a survey of US investors illustrate these ongoing issues. 
3.2.1 Costa Rica 
According to a case study by Alice LeBlanc (1997) of incentives for private sector 
investment in Jl: 
None of the four Costa Rican renewable energy projects has received help 
with project finandng as a result of Jl status. One of these projects is 
operational but did not obtain commerdal finandng: another is under 
construction but has not received construction finandng. 
Two of the forestry projects have received significant Jl funding. One has 
received approximately $900,000, which represents all of "Phase 1" funding, 
but which is less than one fifth of the total project scope. Most of the 
funding comes from an independent power producer in the United States in 
response to a requirement of a power purchase agreement to invest a fixed 
sum of money in carbon offsets. Another organisation donated the money 
for habitat protection . .. 
Several private sector representatives said that they understand and 
support the concept of Jl and hope it will some day provide value for 
environmentally benefidal projects. However, they said they are not 
interested in spending the money required to get offidal governmental 
approval for their projects. One individual said his firm would put terms in 
legal documents that assigned any possible future value of carbon credits to 
the partners in a deal, thus acknowledging that in the future carbon credits 
from J1 projects may be recognised and have value. One sponsor of a USIJI 
project said he had given up looking for investment funds and was trying 
to get grant money. 
3.3 Investor objectives and motivations for the AIJ pilot 
phase 
3.3. 1 In the absence of credits, why is the private sector 
participating at all? 
AIJ investors and project developers are investing during the pilot phase for 
different reasons than they would if certified credits were available. Studies have 
found that AIJ was not itself a primary driver for current AIJ pilot projects 
(Trexler, 1997). Project developers say they are partidpating in the pilot phase of 
AIJ for the following reasons: 
• To comply with domestic regulatory requirements: Regulatory requirements 
in industrialised countries can provide incentives for AIJ investments. For 
example, the electric utility regulatory commission for the state of Oregon in 
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the United States recently gave a siting exemption for new power plant 
construction based on the evaluation of a plan for creating AIJ carbon offsets 
for the new plant's emissions (Carver, P and Trexler, M 1996). 
• To influence climate change pohcy: Companies hope to build support for the 
JI concept and other market-based approaches to climate change mitigation, 
and to play a role in making the rules for a future JI or emissions trading 
system (Trexler and Associates 1997). 
• To gain pubhc recognition: Participants in AIJ projects have been invited to 
present their projects to high-level government officials and other stakeholder 
groups. Others have launched pubhc relations efforts hnked to the projects, 
such as Wisconsin Electric Power Company's contest for schoolchildren to 
visit their forest preservation project in Behze (Trexler and Associates 1997). 
• To forestall mandatory regulations: Companies would prefer voluntary 
programmes to mandatory reduction targets. The emissions reduction 
registries in the Netherlands and the United States, however, show that in 
their first few years voluntary-reduction programmes have stimulated only a 
modest amount of investment (Trexler and Associates 1997). 
• Deflect pohtical pressure: Government officials in some countries have made 
pubhc and private statements putting pressure on the private sector to take 
action (Trexler and Associates 1997). 
• Gain access to new markets: The markets for AIJ are in many cases new both 
geographically and technologically. The wish to gain access to new markets is 
one of the few objectives common to the pilot phase and a mature system with 
crediting (Johnson, Brad 1997 and Shiflett, R 1997). 
In hght of these motivations, some private sector stakeholders have developed 
their own criteria for selecting AIJ investments. The International Utihty 
Efficiency Partnership's investment criteria is one example (Shiflett 1997): 
• Sustained long-term demand for the project's products - i.e. electricity, 
sustainable forestry products. 
• Host country support for the AIJ concept and for fadhtating AIJ project 
development. Support could include government assistance in obtaining 
proper permits, or expedited evaluations. 
• A strong local partner, preferably one with a vested interest in the project's 
success. 
• A large, quantifiable reduction in emissions. 
• Partner and project able to meet lending requirements for interest coverage, 
pay-back period, rate of return, financial balance sheets and guarantees from 
other backers (i.e. government, power purchaser). 
These criteria and perspectives are important to bear in mind as South Africa 
develops an AIJ programme. The section on analysis of issues and criteria will 
therefore refer to these investor perspectives. 



















4. Introduction to the case studies 
This section introduces the four case studies from South Africa which were used 
in the analysis of AI] issues and criteria for South Africa. A brief synopsis of the 
projects and participants is included here, while aspects of the projects which 
pertain to specific AIJ issues are included in the next chapter under each issue 
heading. 
4.1 Housing for a sustainable SA: The Guguletu Eco-
Homes 
proposal 
4.1. 1 Project description 
The project aims to reduce costs and pollution by designing and building homes 
to use energy more efficiently by means of passive solar design: orientation, size 
and position of windows, overhangs, ceilings, shade trees, etc. 
The project will be implemented in Guguletu, a mostly black township on the 
Cape Flats, approximately 20 kilometres from central Cape Town. Guguletu has a 
population of approximately 129 500. Its housing stock consists of approximately 
8 160 formal houses, 3 700 informal structures, several hundred worker hostels 
accommodating 7 300 people, and backyard shacks accommodating 3 500 people. 
Temperatures in Guguletu drop below 5 degrees C (41 degrees F) about 35 nights 
annually, and summers are hot and dry. Guguletu is also buffeted by gale force 
"south easter" winds, which can damage poorly constructed houses. Residents 
currently heat their homes with kerosene, electricity and liquefied petroleum gas 
(LPG). 
The homes in the project will be based on the "Eco-Home" design from PEER 
Africa. PEER pioneered this energy-cost-optimised design and implementation 
concept that builds upon work by the South African Department of Minerals and 
Energy, Eskom, CSIR, and Professor Dieter Holm. The Eco-Home fits into RDP 
housing efforts, giving people the option of using their RDP housing subsidy to 
build a home with passive solar and energy efficiency measures. Measures 
include ceiling and wall insulation, optimised solar orientation and room 
positioning, and behavioural training for residents. The project will help upgrade 
the design of up to 6 000 homes in Guguletu. (Community of Guguletu PEER 
Consultants, PC and International Institute for Energy Conservation 1997) 
4. 1.2 Participants in the project 
SOUTH AFRICA: 
Community of Guguletu -
The Community of Guguletu will be the primary South African partner, and has 
already organised community meetings to discuss the possibility of Eco-homes 
with local residents. 
UNITED STATES: 
PEER Consultants P.C 
PEER Consultants is an environmental engineering firm based in the United 
States. The focus of PEER's activities in South Africa is the provision of energy 
efficient, environmentally sustainable housing. PEER is a certified woman-owned, 
black-owned business. 
International Institute for Energy Conservation (IIEC) 
IIEC is a world-wide non-profit organisation with offices in the United States, 
Thailand, Chile, the United Kingdom and South Africa. IIEC works to promote 
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4. 1.3 Status of project development 
The project proposal has been recommended for approval by the AIJ Working 
Group, and is being formally voted on at the NCCC at its January 1998 meeting. 
The USIJI is prepared to accept the project if the South African government 
accepts it and provides a letter indicating as much (Scholand, M. 1998). 
4.2 Hot water for Lwandle 
4.2. 1 Project description 
This project is part of a larger AIJ proposal on sustainable housing which has been 
submitted to the Dutch AIJ programme for support. The focus of the project is the 
thermal improvement of the worker hostels in Lwandle, as well as the provision 
of solar water-heating. 
Lwandle is a predominantly black community in the Cape Flats region of the 
Western Cape, under the the jurisdiction of the Helderburg municipality. The 
Lwandle hostels are government-owned housing. Although the hostels were 
originally built to house black male workers away from white urban areas, today 
they are an affordable housing opportunity as part of the national "Hostels to 
Homes" campaign. 
The hostel residents currently heat water with paraffin, LPG and wood, all of 
which pose fire and health hazards. The project has been investigating options to 
upgrade energy services, including hot water. Studies found that the most cost-
effective method was to use solar water-heaters, with gas in-line heaters as a back-
up measure. The Lwandle community seeks to install solar water-heaters with 
non-electric back-up heaters for 371 shower units. Some of the showers are 
private, while others are in communal ablution facilities and would have "pay-as-
you-use" meters to ensure fairness and cost recovery. The Lwandle hostel 
community has already raised R400 000 of the project cost. The initial investment 
in the solar/gas hot water system, however, was higher than for electric in-line 
heaters, prompting the community to seek AIJ financing (Netherlands Energy 
Research Foundation, IIEC and ABT Consulting Engineers 1997). 
4.2.2 Participants in the project 
SOUTH ARUCA: 
Lwandle Hostels to Homes project -
Lwandle Hostels to Homes project is part of the national "Hostels to Homes" 
campaign to upgrade hostels into appropriate and safe housing (Scholand, M. 
1998). 
Energy Transformations 
Energy Transformations is a Cape Town-based energy consultancy that was 
invited to advise the Lwandle community on energy issues. The firm has 
conducted analysis of options to provide hot water for the hostels, and has 
presented Lwandle's case to the Helderburg municipality (Thome, S 1997) 
IIEC-Africa 
IIEC-Africa is co-ordinating development of a larger proposal on sustainable 




IIEC-Europe will hase with Dutch partner organisations and the Dutch Ministry 
for Development Co-operation (DGIS) (Netherlands Energy Research Foundation, 
IIEC and ABT Consulting Engineers 1997). 
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Netherlands Energy Research Foundation (ECN), Petten, Netherlands 
The Netherlands Energy Research Foundation (ECN) is the leading energy 
research centre in the Netherlands, with programmes on fossil fuels, nuclear 
energy, radiation technology pohcy studies, energy engineering and renewable 
energy. Under the renewable energy unit, the group for the Built Environment is 
active in research, development and consultancy in the field of renewable energy, 
energy efficiency technologies for buildings and urban areas and co-operation 
with developing countries (Scholand, M. 1998). 
Dutch manufacturers 
Dutch water-meter and non-electrical water-heater manufacturers will provide 
"pay-as-you-use" meters for the communal showers, non-electrical back-up 
water-heaters and advice on retrofitting. They may also enter into joint ventures 
for local manufacturing (AIJ Project in South Africa 1997). 
4.2.3 Status of project development 
The Lwandle community and Energy Transformations presented their findings to 
the Helderburg City Council in November 1997. The Dutch AIJ programme will 
take its decision on the project in late January 1998 (Scholand, M. 1998). 
4.3 Clean Commute trip reduction programme 
4.3. 1 Project description 
K yalami Park is a business park in Midrand, South Africa, with over 2000 
employees. Like many areas, Kyalami Park lacks the infrastructure to ensure 
pedestrian safety (such as crosswalks and pedestrian overpasses). Commuters 
currently endure worsening congestion, dangerous street-crossings, unrehable 
pubhc transport, and parking shortages. For these reasons, commuters currently 
rely mainly on private vehicles, often with a single occupant, and on "kombi" 
taxis, an industry plagued by turf violence. The project aims to improve pubhc 
awareness of costs and pollution impact of transport alternatives. Clean Commute 
will implement an employer-based trip reduction program, which consists of a 
customised set of actions (IIEC Transport Program 1997). The menu of actions 
includes: 
1. Alternatives to single occupant vehicle 
• carpool programmes; 
• vanpool programmes; 
• bicycle/pedestrian fadhties; 
• pubhc transport service improvements. 
2. Incentives and disincentives 
• preferential high occupancy vehicles treatments, such as preferential parking; 
• pubhc transport and ride sharing incentives; 
• parking supply and pricing management. 
3. Alternative work arrangements 
• variable work hours; 
• telecommuting. 
• (IIEC Transport Program 1997). 
4.3.2 Participants 
SOUTH AFRICA: 
Midrand Transport Association (MIDTRAN) 
MIDTRAN is a non-government organisation established by the Midrand Local 
Council to assist in designing transport options for organisations in the Midrand 
area, and to support solutions to taxi-related ·violence (IIEC Transport Program 
1997). 
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International Institute for Energy Conservation (IIEC) and IIEC-Africa 
IIEC is a US-registered non-profit organisation dedicated to promoting 
sustainable energy use. IIEC has branch offices in Chile, Thailand, the United 
Kingdom and South Africa (Scholand, M. 1998). 
Kyalami Park employers and commuters 
• Businesses and employees in the Kyalami Business Park will select and 
implement Clean Commute measures, with the assistance and support of 
MIDTRAN and IIEC (IIEC Transport Program 1997). 
UNITED STATES: 
IIEC is seeking to identify additional project partners from the United States, 
possibly an employer that has implemented its own trip reduction programme. 
4.3.3 Status of project development 
IIEC recently won a grant from the USIJI to develop Clean Commute into a full-
fledged AIJ project proposal (Scholand, M. 1998). IIEC and MIDTRAN have 
already conducted a survey on Kyalami Business Park, which indicated that the 
business park environment had high levels of traffic congestion and associated 
emissions. They have also been working with a geographic information system to 
analyse commuting patterns in the area (IIEC Transport Program 1997). 
4.4 Steel processing efficiency 
4.4. l Project description 
The project consists of a co-operative study of potential measures to reduce 
emissions of greenhouse gases through improving the process efficiency of steel 
manufacturing. The participants will investigate possible measures at four sites of 
Iscor Ltd: Vanderbiglpark, Newcastle, Pretoria and Vereeniging. lscor and 
Hoogovens may decide to implement one or more of the identified measures, but 
they are not obhged to do so (Iscor and Hoogovens, 1997). 
The project study will take following steps: 
• audit existing GHG emissions; 
• prepare a basehne report; 
• make recommendations for "good housekeeping" and training 
• investigate viable and cost effective opportunities to reduce enuss1ons of 
internally generated gases and the usage of waste combustible gases 
• determine operational requirements and estimate costs and benefits of 
measures; 
• prepare a report which will include a financing plan for each selected option, 
and a training programme to improve plant operation efficiency through 
operator behaviour. 
• (Iscor and Hoogovens, 1997 
Prehminary calculations estimate the project could save up to 880,000 tons of 




Iscor privatised in 1989, and is listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(Scholand, M. 1998). 
NETHERLANDS: 
Hoogovens Staal BV 
Hoogovens is a Dutch steel products manufacturer. Hoogovens has entered into 
an agreement with the Ministry of Economic Affairs of the Netherlands to 
promote energy efficiency, and has agreed to reduce COz emissions at its plant in 
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Ijmuiden. Hoogovens Technical Service Europe is an affiliate which will be 
implementing the feasibility study (Iscor & Hoogovens, 1997). 
4.4.3 Status of project development 
Hoogovens and Iscor have signed a letter of intent and an agreement to execute a 
study of possible measures to reduce C02 emissions from Iscor' s metallurgical 
facilities (Iscor & Hoogovens, 1997). The Minister for Development Co-operation 
of the Netherlands and the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism of 
South Africa are negotiating a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which is 
required to release funds for the study (Weather Bureau 1998). The DEAT would 
sign the MOU, but as the funds would be considered foreign assistance, the 
Department of Finance, and perhaps even the Deputy President's Office, would 
have to be informed and approve of the project (Scholand, M. 1998). 





















5. Developing criteria 
5.1 Mission and Objectives 
The mission and objectives of the programme will guide the criteria, process and 
institutional structures used to evaluate AIJ projects. It is important to have wide 
agreement on the mission and objectives, therefore, before moving to criteria for 
evaluation. 
5.1. 1 Mission 
A survey of countries' reports on AIJ to the UNFCCC revealed broadly similar 
mission statements for a range of countries. Investor and host countries differ in 
that investor AIJ programmes emphasise possible global benefits and the social, 
economic and environmental impacts associated with AIJ or future JI. Host 
countries' programmes, by contrast, place more weight on determining possible 
national and local benefits and risks associated with AIJ or future JI (Ministry of 
Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM) 1997 & CC: INFO/ AIJ 
1997 & Climate Network Africa (CAN) 1995 & Figueres, C, Hambleton, A, Lay, L, 
MacDicken, K, Petricone, S, Swisher, J, 1996 & lnstituto Nacional de Ecologica 
1997 & Maya and Gupta 1996). 
Participants in the South African Workshops generally agreed with the synthesis 
mission statement presented by EDRC, but most participants did not state an 
strong opinion. 
Recommendation: 
The mission of the South African AIJ programme should be to evaluate the local 
and global impacts, both positive and negative, of AIJ projects in order to 
determine conditions for equitable and effective AIJ. In addition, the programme 
should facilitate foreign investment in projects that support South Africa's 
development objective while reducing emissions of greenhouse gases. 
5. 1.2 Objectives 
The four objectives of national AI] activities most commonly cited by Parties to 
the UNCFCC (CC: INFO/ AIJ 1997) are to: 
• contribute to establishing methodologies for effectively measuring GHG 
emission reductions or sequestration; 
• promote technology transfer; 
• formulate strategies to encourage private sector participation; 
• maximise participation and learning. 
During the workshop discussion, EDRC facilitators asked if participants thought 
that these objectives should be prioritised or were all equally important. The 
workshop discussion noted that, although the ultimate objective of AIJ was to 
reduce emissions, the primary objective of the pilot phase was to evaluate whether 
AIJ or Jl would be an effective and equitable mechanism for reducing emissions. To 
evaluate this requires broad participation and many projects. 
Recommendation: 
The objectives of the South African AIJ programme should be to: 
• maximise participation and learning during the pilot phase; 
• promote technology transfer and capacity building; 
• formulate strategies to encourage participation by the private sector and non-
government and community based organisations; 
• contribute to methodologies for effectively measuring greenhouse gas 
emissions and sequestration. 
The AIJ programme must also facilitate South -Africa's participation in the review 
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5.2 The basis for developing criteria 
5.2.1 What are criteria meant to do? 
AIJ criteria are the standards by which a national AIJ programme evaluates 
proposed projects. They should not only identify important issues and hurdles for 
projects; they should indicate what is required for a project to be acceptable with 
regard to that issue. Since all AIJ projects will be undertaken within the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, all AIJ criteria must be consistent 
with current international pohcy. Individual countries must establish how to 
interpret international criteria, as well as decide whether to add additional criteria 
or conditions for project acceptance. An illustration from Costa Rica's programme 
is presented in Box 1. 
The criteria established at the first session of the Conference of the Parties in 1995 
in Berhn provided a starting point for evaluating AIJ projects. The Kyoto Protocol 
has since created some uncertainty for AIJ in developing countries by not 
mentioning AIJ by name anywhere in the document, and by establishing a "Oean 
Development Mechanism" which would allow developing countries to generate 
certified emission reduction credits with investments from industrialised 
countries (Conference of the Parties 1997). Since certified emission reduction 
credits will not be vahd until after 2000, and since specific procedures for the 
Clean Development Mechanism will not be decided until subsequent negotiations, 
this report presumes that the Berhn Criteria will continue to guide AIJ projects in 
the interim. 
Box 1. Costa Rica used the following guidelines (Figueres, C, Hambleton, A, 
Lay, L, MacDicken, K, Petricone, S, Swisher, J, 1997) to develop their All 
project criteria: 
Minimise red tape: as few criteria as possible, and highest possible levels of 
consistency with existing sets of criteria in established national programmes of 
industrialised nations. 
Meet current international standards: criteria should meet current pilot phase 
standards set by the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC. 
Represent Costa Rica's particular interests (country-driven): criteria should address 
Costa Rican development priorities as distinct from the considerations of the 
investor country or of other developing nations. 
Address GHG abatement benefits sharing among participants: criteria should 
address quantification and monetary valuation of the GHG abatement, 
including the sharing of the monetary surplus between the buyers and the 
sellers. 
5.2.2 Purpose of South African criteria 
The central challenge of developing national AIJ criteria is to strike an appropriate 
balance between strong guidance, so that projects are acceptable to the host 
country, and the flexibility to allow for innovation and broad experience. Investor 
interest is hkely to be highest in countries with relatively flexible requirements. 
Thus, while stringent national criteria may increase the comfort level of host 
countries, they may dampen interest from project developers and investors. 
5.2.2.1 Input from the workshops 
During the workshop discussions, participants agreed that South Africa AIJ 
criteria should: 
• meet current international standards; 
• represent national interests; 
• address technical greenhouse gas issues; 
• minimise institutional demands; 
• address distribution of project benefits; 
• ensure consistency with specific national pohcies; 
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• promote cost effectiveness. 
Partidpants also felt that the overall AIJ programme objective of maximising 
learning and partidpation should be kept in mind when developing criteria. 
Recommendation: 
South African AIJ stakeholders should bear in mind the need for flexibility and 
encouraging learning in the pilot phase when interpreting or adding to the criteria 
for AIJ project selection. The South African AIJ programme should distinguish 
both criteria for the pilot phase and plans for future involvement with the CDM 
and crediting. 
5.3 AIJ issue analysis and criteria 
This section of the report addresses major issues raised by local stakeholders and 
by EDRC's research on international experience with AIJ. For each issue we 
present relevant international decisions and background followed by illustrations 
of how other countries have attempted to tackle the issues. We highlight South 
Africa's experience with examples from proposed AIJ projects as well as 
discussion and input from stakeholder workshops. Each issue section concludes 
with EDRC's analysis and recommendations. Not all issues need become criteria. 
Some issues can be effectively addressed through appropriate institutional 
arrangements, information dissemination, or other AIJ programme-related 
activities. 
5.3.1 Compatible with and supportive of national priorities 
Berlin Criteria 
... activities implemented jointly should be compatible with and supportive 
of national environment and development priorities and strategies ... 
South Africa's position on All 
AIJ projects can be considered only if they contribute to national 
development programmes, and need to be synchronised with such 
programmes. 
Throughout the negotiations on Activities Implemented Jointly, representatives 
from developing countries have expressed concern that AIJ not develop into a 
mechanism for outside investors or donors to control the course of development. 
Developing countries can use this first of the Berlin criteria to ensure that AIJ 
projects are consistent with national priorities. However, the criterion presumes 
that each country has clearly articulated these priorities in a way that is accessible 
to potential AIJ project developers. A related question is whether national 
guidelines should restrict projects to particular sectors which are a high priority 
for development (such as investment in energy infrastructure or community 
forestry). 
Many countries do not have clearly articulated development plans, making it 
difficult for an AIJ project developer to assess the project's compatibility with 
national priorities. South Africa has an advantage in that the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) and the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) macroeconomic policy have been widely publicised 
expressions of national goals and priorities. 
5.3.1.1 Experience from other countries 
Clarifying national development goals 
Several countries have used their AIJ programme documents to lay out national 
priorities, while others are setting up mechanisms to direct AIJ investment to key 
sustainable development goals. 
Costa Rica has taken both of these approaches by explaining its sustainable 
development priorities within the AIJ criteria document and by establishing a 
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greenhouse gas-related fund to manage large-scale AIJ projects. The AIJ 
programme documents (CC:INFO/ AIJ 1997) spedfically mention the following 
areas: 
• Biodiversity conservation, reforestation and forest conservation, sustainable 
land use, watershed protection, air and water pollution reduction, reduction 
of fossil fuel consumption, increased utilisation of renewable resources, 
enhanced energy efficiency and support for Costa Rica's efforts to fulfil its 
obhgations under the UNFCCC, Biological Diversity and Agenda 21. 
• Enhancement of income opportunities and quahty of hfe for the Costa Rican 
civil society. 
• A minimised or acceptably low level of adverse consequences of the project 
through site selection, scale adjustment, timing, attenuation, and mitigating 
measures. 
• Local capacity building such as the transfer and adaptation of know-how and 
high quahty technologies. 
In addition, Costa Rica estabhshed a "national spedfic fund" to serve as "an 
efficient mechanism to direct and manage AIJ foreign investments" (Le Blanc 
1997). The fund aims to facihtate financing and execution of national-scope AI] 
projects of strategic value to the country and to reduce transaction costs (see 
Figure 6). 
Poland includes excerpts from its national environmental law in its AIJ program 
materials, and places a high priority on "economic use of natural resources" and 
"utilisation of modern production processes" in AIJ projects (Galan-Kozakiewicz 
1997). 
In Zimbabwe, the Southern Centre for Energy and Environment suggested that 
Zimbabwe should require AIJ projects to contribute to value-added products in 
the secondary and tertiary levels of production, such as secondary processing of 
mineral products, rather than focus on primary industries such as forestry and 
agriculture (Maya and Gupta 1996). 
Finally, Mexico requires that AI] energy projects promote private investment in 
Mexico's energy sector, thereby supporting national privatisation efforts (lnstituto 







Figure 6. Costa Rican national AIJ fund 
Sectoral priorities or restrictions 
Countries can channel AIJ investment towar9. priority sectors and away from 
areas they wish to keep off-hmits by including these preferences in their AIJ 
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project selection criteria, or by providing the information, as an addendum to the 
criteria, to potential developers. 
Poland calls for projects that directly reduce the generation of greenhouse gases in 
the production of goods and services (rather than the sequestration of those gases) 
by (i) improving the effidency of raw materials use or improving composition 
thereof (by changing fuels, for example), (ii) redudng the GHG content of wastes 
through chemical, biological, or physical treatment processes or recycling, as well 
as projects that remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere (such as carbon 
sequestration by tree-planting). Poland also lists spedfic priority project areas, 
such as redudng low stack emissions and improving heating effidency (Galan-
Kozakiewicz 1997). 
Mexico lists separate criteria for energy projects and natural resource projects. 
Forestry projects must provide evidence of defined property rights and the 
community's long term commitment to the project. Energy projects must promote 
private investment in Mexico's energy sector (Instituto Nadonal de Ecologia 
1997). 
5.3.1.2 Illustration from South Africa 
The "Housing for a healthier future in South Africa" proposal, a four part project 
to improve thermal performance and provide hot water has made spedfic 
reference to South African priorities. The document includes excerpts from the 
RDP, the Bill of Rights, the Draft White Paper on Energy, and the Housing White 
Paper. The excerpts include references to improving thermal performance, 
promoting energy-effident appliances, and instalhng solar hot water-heaters, all 
of which are components of the proposed project (Netherlands Energy Research 
Foundation et al1997). 
5.3.1.3 Input from workshops 
Workshop partidpants discussed how to ensure that AIJ projects recognise and 
support national development priorities. One government representative said that 
AIJ projects should support human resource capadty building and sodal 
advancement for disadvantaged communities. Industry representatives 
emphasised that AIJ projects would in any case need to comply with national 
pohdes on environment, energy, and water, among other areas; the AIJ 
programme should not "reinvent" these priorities. Workshop partidpants agreed 
that the South African AIJ programme would have to distinguish between 
priorities that are essential for project acceptance and those which increase the 
likelihood of project acceptance, but are not requirements. 
5.3.1.4 Analysis and recommendations 
Host countries can encourage quahty AIJ projects that are supportive of national 
priorities by taking an active approach to criteria development that addresses 
national priorities and investor concerns. Countries can channel AIJ investment 
toward priority sectors either by including preferences in AIJ project selection 
criteria or by providing information to potential project developers as an 
addendum to the criteria. 
As with most AIJ pohcy issues, there are benefits and costs assodated with 
sped.fying desirable and undesirable project characteristics. The more spedfic and 
mandatory the spedfications, the more confidence the host country may have that 
AIJ projects will not stray from the national development path. However, detailed 
and numerous requirements can dampen investor interest. 
South Africa needs to take a strategic approach that allows for a variety of 
projects but also asks whether they fit with national objectives. The Chmate 
Change Polley Discussion Document and the Chmate Change Country Study, due 
out in 1998, will both be valuable inputs to setting priorities. Of the activities 
identified in the Country Study, some will be more appropriate for AIJ than 
others (see discussion under "Cost-effectiveness vs cherry-picking"). 
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Recommendations: 
• The South African AIJ programme should announce preferred types of AI] 
projects in its programme information materials. General priority areas 
should be selected from the RDP, such as low-income housing, pubhc 
transport, or a healthy hving environment. 
• The mitigation options identified within the Chmate Change Country Study 
and National Action Plan should be separated into the following categories 
for the purpose of securing funding for implementation: 
• projects or interventions which South Africa will implement and fund 
internally; 
• projects which South Africa will implement but fund with international aid; 
• projects which are feasible and desirable under current AIJ; 
• projects which are feasible and desirable under future JI or a CDM framework 
with certified crediting. 
5.3.2 Compatibility with local priorities 
The Berhn Criteria require compatibility with national priorities, but make no 
mention of local priorities. National governments are the designated Parties to the 
Convention, so UNFCCC insistence on supporting local priorities could be 
viewed as an infringement on national sovereignty. Most AIJ programmes in 
industrialised countries (eg US, Germany, Canada, Japan, Austraha, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden) make no mention of local priorities, although the Netherlands 
requires "clear benefidallocal environment benefits" and others consider general 
economic, environmental and sodal impacts (eg Japan, Austraha, US) 
(CC:INFO/ AIJ 1997, Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment 
1997). 
5.3.2.1 Experience from other countries 
Some developing countries exphdtly require some type of acceptance by local 
communities: 
Costa Rica's proposal guidehnes ask whether the local community will 
partidpate in and benefit from AIJ projects. In addition, Costa Rica's Certifiable, 
Tradable Offsets (CTO) materials emphasise the need to respect local landholders 
(LeBlanc 1997). 
Indonesia has already experienced conflicts between national and local priorities. 
Indonesia's first AI] forestry project, a reduced impact logging project in East 
Kahmantan, is consistent with offidal national priorities, but potentially counter 
to local priorities. The Indonesian forestry sector is characterised by a few major 
companies with close ties to high-level government offidals. Indonesian and 
international NGOs report that the large companies have used their market and 
pohtical power to virtually ehminate competition from small, locally owned forest 
products enterprises (Fried 1997). Although the USIJI consulted the USAID 
mission in Jakarta as part of evaluating the project proposal, the mission lacked 
the resources to conduct any consultations with local groups (Hesen 1997). 
Indonesian and international environmentalists have argued that the Indonesian 
and US approval of the project is illegitimate because neither government 
adequately consulted local people. They argue that, without partidpation by local 
people, the projects may continue destructive forestry practices, excessive 
emissions of greenhouse gases, and oppression of local people. 
Mexico requires that forestry projects provide evidence of the Mexican partners' 
defined property rights for land used by AIJ projects and the community's long-
term commitment to the project. One of Mexico's first AIJ projects, in fact, 
supports a community forestry scheme in Chiapas (Instituto Nadonal de Ecologia 
1997, JI Onhne 1997). Mexico's requirement to prove property rights and for 
community commitment to forestry projects may require extra effort by project 
developers, but may result in lower risk, more-durable greenhouse gas offsets. In 
addition, the requirement should help protect Mexican communities if indeed 
they have legal rights to the land. 
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5.3.2.2 Illustrations from South Africa 
PEER Consultants built two demonstration Eco-Homes in Guguletu The homes 
were open for community inspection and PEER sponsored a community forum to 
help residents understand the application requirements for housing subsidies. In 
April 1997 the local council and the Community Development Corporation of 
Guguletu endorsed developing Eco-Homes as an AIJ project (Community of 
Gugulethu et al1997). 
The Lwandle community itself initiated the water-heating project and retained 
Energy Transformations to analyse cost-effective options (Netherlands Energy 
Research Foundation et al1997). 
5.3.2.3 Input from workshops 
Several workshop participants emphasised that local consultation and 
participation were already requirements for many investment and development 
activities in South Africa. 
5.3.2.4 Analysis and recommendations 
Assessing local support presents procedural and political challenges. Positions 
would vary among stakeholders, and it may be difficult to assemble a credible 
local reference group for a proposed project. It is also possible that some local 
communities might be reluctant to express their opposition. Transaction costs will 
increase with the level of consultation required. The investor country government 
is not likely to understand the local context well enough to judge whether a 
proposed project is appropriate, and does not have the authority to make such 
judgements. Therefore, the host country must take responsibility for assessing 
compatibility within the local context. 
Recommendations: 
• AIJ project proponents should demonstrate that they have consulted with 
relevant local stakeholders who would be affected by the project. 
• The evaluators of AIJ proposals (eg, the AIJ Working Group or a technical 
reference group) should also consider how to incorporate local input or 
confirm that relevant local stakeholders have been consulted. 
• AIJ project monitoring should include the impacts of the project on the local 
community. 
5.3.3 Cost-effectiveness vs "cherry picking" 
Berlin Criteria 
... activities implemented jointly should contribute to cost-effectiveness in 
achieving global benefits. 
South Africa's position on AIJ 
AIJ projects must contribute to the achievement of the objective of the 
UNFCCC by aiming to bring about, in a cost-effective manner ... 
environmental benefits related to the mitigation of climate change 
The introduction of this paper reviewed the economic arguments for the global 
cost- effectiveness of joint implementation and emissions trading, based on taking 
advantage of the least expensive emissions reductions first. Industrialised 
countries are interested in South Africa primarily because there are opportunities 
to invest in energy, transport and other improvements and reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases at lower marginal cost per ton of carbon than at home. Some 
opportunities are even profitable, so that investors can make money while 
reducing emissions; these are the "no-regrets" measures as shown in Figure 7. 
From an economic perspective, rational AIJ investors would seek the lowest cost-
per-ton projects first. 
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Figure 7. "No-regrets" and cost of emissions reductions 
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As the emitter of 95% of all greenhouse gases from SADC countries, and as a 
middle-income country, South Africa may face its own emissions reduction 
obligations in the future. With this in mind, several stakeholders have expressed 
concern that AIJ investors may "pick off all the cherries", investing in the lowest 
cost mitigation measures, leaving only the higher cost measures for the time when 
South Africa is required to undertake its own mitigation actions. 
5.3.3.1 Experience from other countries 
Countries are divided on whether they wish to prevent "no-regrets" AIJ projects. 
Poland, for example, even encouraged some "no-regrets" projects, while Kenyan 
stakeholders were much more concerned. 
Poland's criteria clearly state that JI projects should directly or indirectly result in 
cost-effective realisation of environmental goals. Where JI projects involve the 
installation of new capital equipment, they should also lead to a net reduction (or 
at least no increase) in the facility's costs of meeting current and anticipated 
environmental standards. The preference for projects that involve, for example, 
process changes and pollution reduction technologies, could easily result in a 
large number of "no-regrets" projects even though it would deter inexpensive 
forestry projects (Galan-Kozakiewicz 1997). 
Interviews conducted in Kenya as part of the Kadoma research project revealed a 
preference among AIJ stakeholders to limit AIJ to projects that Kenya could not 
implement independently. The project cites carbon sequestration as an area Kenya 
could implement and so should not be available for AIJ (Climate Network Africa 
1995). While this is not exactly the same as ruling out "no-regrets" projects, the 
position would prevent "cherry-picking'' in forestry projects. 
5.3.3.2 Illustration from South Africa 
One could argue that the thermal performance measures in the Guguletu AIJ 
project, the Lwandle solar hot water-heaters, and the steel processing 
improvements are all low-cost measures that South Africa should keep in reserve 
to meet its own future obligations. In the Guguletu case, IIEC has argued that the 
reductions are a one-time _opportunity that, if not seized now, will be lost because 
the houses will already be built without the Eco-Home features. 
Research from the Energy and Development Research Centre on providing energy 
efficiency to the urban poor shows that interventions such as the installation of 
energy-efficient lighting, improving the thermal efficiency of housing and 
switching from paraffin to other fuels have net economic benefits. EDRC has 
found this to be true even when the avoided health and environmental costs of 
energy use are ignored. While these options are "no-regrets" in an economic 
sense, the window of opportunity to implement them (for example, through the 
mass housing programme) is closing and South Africa has not yet invested in 
these options on a large scale (Fecher 1998; Simmonds & Clark 1998). · 
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5.3.3.3 Input from workshops 
Participants from industry suggested that South Africa should promote the most 
expensive projects for AIJ financing, and keep low-cost and the "no-regrets" 
opportunities in reserve for implementation by South Africa. Another option 
would be for South Africa to charge a premium for cheap C02 reductions (in 
addition to the project costs) to fund (more expensive) future emission reductions. 
However, projects in South Africa must be less expensive than emissions 
reduction opportunities in investor countries as well as other host countries if 
there are to be any AIJ opportunities. An industry representative proposed 
allowing "cherry picking" projects such as solar water-heating to go forward 
under AIJ, but requiring transfer of patent or design rights so that South Africa 
could rephcate the project independently. In this way AIJ could be used to 
leverage much greater benefits for South Africa. 
One project developer was concerned that a restrictive "cherry picking" pohcy 
would postpone or prevent implementation of relatively low-cost projects that 
could provide significant benefits other than GHG reductions, to the detriment of 
those communities. These "lost opportunities" could not be recovered in the 
future. Some projects, such as RDP low-income housing would go forward 
without AIJ and without the benefits of energy-efficient design. 
5.3.3.4 Analysis and recommendations 
South Africa would hmit potential Jl opportunities by restricting AIJ to only high-
cost projects when cheaper options are available. Since the pilot phase allows no 
credits, investors are seeking "no-regrets" and low-cost projects with enough non-
AIJ returns to justify the investment. In the long run, South Africa could address 
the problem of" cherry picking" through several strategies: 
• Charging an additional fee for the "lowest cost" emissions reductions. The fee 
would have to be negotiated so that the cost of emission reductions would 
still be lower in South Africa than in the investor country. However, since 
emission reductions from developing countries cannot be credited until 2000, 
project developers may be unwilhng to pay any extra fees before that time. 
• Requiring a transfer of technology and/ or capacity so that South Africa could 
rephcate the project independently. 
• Negotiating to keep a higher share of "credits" from low- or negative-cost 
reductions than for higher cost reductions. South Africa could "bank" these 
recorded reductions for the future, subject to rules adopted by the Parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol. Keeping a higher share of reductions effectively raises the 
price-per-ton of the lower cost projects and may be perceived as less 
burdensome than a fee. 
5.3.4 Government acceptance 
Berlin Criterion 
That all activities implemented jointly under this pilot phase require prior 
acceptance, approval or endorsement by the Governments of the Parties 
participating in these activities. 
Kyoto Protocol 
... voluntary participation approved by each Party involved. (Article 12.5 ) 
Governments often have not had evaluation procedures in place when the first 
AIJ projects seek official acceptance. In many cases a single ministry has produced 
a letter indicating general approval of the projects as a contribution to the AIJ 
pilot phase. As some project developers and governments have already 
discovered, an ad-hoc approach can create controversies of legitimacy if it does 
not evolve quickly into a coherent national programme. In addition, the high 
transaction costs associated with AIJ projects are largely due to the cost of dealing 
with unclear or cumbersome government procedures and developing very 
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specific proposals. These are strong reasons for South Africa to develop clear 
institutional structures, polities and procedures for AIJ. 
5.3.4.1 Experience from other countries 
Experience in the Czech Republic shows why proper government procedures and 
responsibility are necessary for AIJ projects. The Center for Clean Air Policy, a 
Washington-based non-government organisation, and the dty of Dedn, in the 
Czech Republic, collaborated to develop one of the first AIJ projects in the world, 
a fuel-switch from coal to natural gas for the dty' s district heating plant. The 
Center and Dedn negotiated and signed agreements to develop the project and 
distribute the emissions reductions among the project partidpants (including 
three US electric utilities). At the time the Czech Republic had not established 
offidal procedures for evaluating proposed AIJ projects. 
The project broke ground in 1995 amid great fanfare and was widely publicised as 
an AIJ success story. In 1996 the Czech national government was systematically 
reviewing its AIJ policy and withdrew approval for the Dedn project on the 
grounds that local authorities had no right to sell or allocate national property (the 
emissions reductions). The Dedn project finally received formal approval from 
the Czech government the next year, and the national Czech AIJ guidelines now 
state clearly that all applications must include a statement from both governments 
which are parties to the UNFCCC (Center for Clean Air Policy 1995, Bittle-
Koenick 1997). 
The Netherlands AIJ programme has a multi-stage approval process that allows 
for several reviews of project concepts as they are developed. Figure 8 illustrates 
the process for the steel processing effidency project involving Iscor and 
Hoogovens. The Netherlands Development Agency reviews project concepts early 
on, and notifies the project developer within two weeks as to whether they should 
proceed in formulating a full proposal and preparing letters of intent between 
parties involved in the project. If the proposal is approved, the Netherlands 
Development Assistance Agency (NEDA) provides funds for a feasibility study. 
NEDA makes a final decision on the project only after the letters of intent are 
signed and feasibility studies are complete, (Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning 
and Environment 1997). 
STEPS 
Formulation of project idea 
~ 
Approval of idea 
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Letter of intent, agreement 




Approval of study proposal 
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South African A/J programme? 
Figure 8. Netherlands AIJ approval process for steel project 
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By contrast, the Unites States Initiative on Joint Implementation does not require 
early discussion with developers and does not automatically provide funds for 
feasibility studies when it approves projects. In the first few groups of project 
proposals that were reviewed a project developer could submit full proposal to 
the USIJI without any prior communication with the USIJI Secretariat. 
The USIJI Secretariat does convene groups of outside experts in energy and 
forestry to discuss each round of project proposals. These technical reference 
groups focus mainly on the greenhouse gas and AIJ-specific aspects of the project, 
rather than the economic viability. 
Project developers have criticised USIJI for the significant expense of getting 
through the approval process. They have complained that the process is time-
consuming and bureaucratic, even if the government approval at the end is 
critical (Trexler 1997; LeBlanc 1997). 
One of the main objectives of Costa Rica's Certifiable Tradable Offsets (CTO) 
initiative and the establishment of national umbrella projects is to reduce project 
transaction costs. By purchasing CTOs, the investor can avoid both submitting a 
proposal and paying for the sometimes costly government evaluation and 
acceptance process. Developers can also reduce project risk with "umbrella" 
projects - national-scale projects which comprise many smaller sub-projects - that 
are insured against non-performance (LeBlanc 1997). 
5.3.4.2 Illustration from South Africa 
The Netherlands Development Assistance Agency approved the concept of an AIJ 
project to improve steel process efficiency. Project developers included 
Hoogovens, a Dutch steel company, and Iscor, a South African Steel Company. 
Hoogovens and Iscor signed letters of intent in November 1997 to proceed with a 
feasibility study (Iscor and Hoogovens 1997). The Dutch AIJ process requires a 
Memorandum of Understanding between the Dutch and South African 
governments as a condition of releasing funds for the feasibility study. The Dutch 
AIJ office and the South African DEAT are currently negotiating the text of the 
memorandum (Kant 1997). 
The NCCC was forced to adopt an ad-hoc process for evaluating AIJ projects 
because several proposals were submitted prior to the initiation of the Climate 
Change White Paper process. The AIJ Working Group received proposals that had 
also been submitted to the Dutch and US AIJ programmes. The members of the 
AIJ Working Group reviewed the proposals with the interim South African AIJ 
position as a guide. Members made comments and requested additional 
information from the project proponents, and eventually made recommendations 
to the full membership of the NCCC. A problem with this process is that Working 
Group members do not have systematic access to outside technical experts other 
than those consulted on a voluntary basis. 
5.3.4.3 Input from the workshops 
Workshop participants, particularly the members of the AIJ Working Group, 
agreed that the current process was barely feasible even with the current small 
number of proposals, and that it needed to be rationalised to be sustainable. 
Participants noted that, while the Netherlands and the United States both have a 
reasonably clear process and identified contact people, South Africa has not had a 
clearly designated co-ordinator for the AIJ Working Group. This could lead to 
confusion for project developers and to proposals not going through the proper 
channels. 
Some of the participants noted that the AIJ evaluation process must be clearly 
integrated within the larger pohcy context. For example, most AIJ projects would 
fall under the CONEPP procedures for assessing environmental impacts and 
obtaining community approval. In addition, the representative of the State 
President in the office of the State Law Advisor must approve any bilateral 
international agreement between countries. 
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Several of the workshop participants were in favour of a pre-screening step in the 
process, which would give the AIJ Working Group the opportunity to preview 
project concepts and provide quick feedback. This step should be designed to 
ensure that full project proposals are likely to meet South Africa's AIJ criteria 
before significant resources are devoted to project development. 
On the issue of requiring a feasibility study to be submitted as part of a proposal, 
the discussion reflected the desire for a high level of detail, tempered by an 
understanding of the cost involved. Projects going through the Dutch AIJ 
programme receive funds to conduct feasibility studies as part of the process, but 
projects submitted to the US programme do not automatically receive such 
assistance. One of the project developers who has had experience with both the 
Dutch and US programmes suggested that proponents should be able to consult 
program staff on an informal basis regarding projects concepts. 
The discussion of technical evaluation of project proposals again reflected the 
challenge of balancing the ideal situation - in which project developers and the 
AIJ Working Group would have access throughout the evaluation process to 
sector-specific technical expertise - with the real resource constraints of 
government and the Working Group. Industry participants suggested that sector-
specific feasibility studies be left to the private parties and that the AIJ 
programme need only concern itself with evaluating the estimates of greenhouse 
gas emissions and reductions. 
Workshop participants also felt that the technical evaluation should not be left 
exclusively in the hands of the investor countries' AIJ programmes, and indicated 
that South Africa needed to develop its own climate change technical expertise. 
Once again, a South African AIJ institution will have to balance the need to charge 
an application fee to fund independent evaluation with the recognition that each 
additional cost erects an additional barrier to submitting a proposal in South 
Africa. During the pilot phase, when credits have little or no monetary value, 
project developers will be even less likely to be willing to pay high fees for 
technical evaluations. Participants pointed out that since the pilot phase is meant 
to be a learning process, perhaps South Africa could get access to funds from 
international sources. An industry representative reminded participants that, in a 
mature joint implementation regime, the cost of certifying emission reductions 
should diminish and the procedure would become simply another line in a 
business plan, much like obtaining approval from the reserve bank for foreign 
exchange deals. 
5.3.4.4 Analysis and recommendations 
The recommended process for A1J project evaluation and approval is presented in 
Figure 9. The institutional structure and responsibilities of the AIJ Working Group 
and AIJ Co-ordinator are outlined in the next chapter on "Institutions". 
In addition, the following specific recommendations are made on the approval 
process: 
• Project developers are encouraged to contact the AIJ Co-ordinator early in the 
process of project development to check that it falls within the broad priorities 
for South Africa and to receive programme guidelines. 
• Proposals should be submitted for evaluation to the AIJ Working Group 
through the A1J Co-ordinator . 
• Since South Africa's AIJ criteria will cover a range of technical, soda! and 
economic issues, the South African AIJ institution should invite experts in the 
project type (housing, public transport, industrial energy efficiency) to assess 
the project within the local context. 
• The programme should also encourage AIJ proponents to consider AIJ issues 
when preparing environmental impact assessments, to avoid duplication of 
effort. 
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Figure 9. Proposed South African AIJ approval process 
5.3.5 Emissions additionality 
Berlin criterion: 
36 
That activities implemented jointly should bring real, measurable and long-
term environmental benefits related to the mitigation of climate change that 
would not have occurred in the absence of such activities 
Kyoto Protocol 
[Projects must have] ... reductions in emissions that are additional to any 
that would occur in the absence of the certified activity ... 
Article 12.5 
South Africa's position on AIJ 
AIJ projects must contribute to the achievement of the objective of the 
UNFCCC by aiming to bring about . . . real, measurable and long-term 
environmental benefits related to the mitigation of climate change that 
would not have occurred in the absence of such activities. 
Determining whether an activity is additional to what would have happened 
anyway is a complex exercise. AIJ project evaluators cannot say with certainty 
what would have happened in the absence of the AIJ intervention and are forced 
to make a reasonable guess. AIJ pilot programmes generally asked a project 
proponent to indicate the historical and current situation at the project site (the 
"historical baseline"), make a reasonable projection of what would happen 
without the AIJ intervention (the "reference case"), and compare estimated 
emissions from the reference case to those in the project case in order to estimate 
the project's emissions reduction. 
5.3.5.1 Illustrations from other countries 
Since the UNFCCC negotiations have not produced a specific, practical definition 
of the emission additionality requirement, countries have applied a variety of 
interpretations for pilot projects. In most cases project proponents must 
demonstrate, to the satisfaction of evaluators from host and investor countries, 
that the project will surmount barriers that would normally prevent the project's 
implementation. 
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For one commercial wind power project in Costa Rica, proponents argued that 
AI] status moved the project more quickly through negotiations and permitting 
with the parastatal electric utility. They also suggested AIJ status would help the 
project gain financing. So far, however, financiers have not recognised any 
"bankable value" in the AI] approval (Trexler and Associates 1997, LeBlanc 1997). 
In Belize, a carbon sequestration project obtained private funding from US 
electricity utilities and support from the Nature Conservancy environmental 
organisation based on interest in demonstrating AI]' s viability (Trexler and 
Associates 1997). Presumably the electric utilities would have been less likely to 
fund such a project in the absence of AI]. 
In addition to the above examples, criteria and proposal guidelines for AIJ 
demonstrate how individual countries have tried to grapple with establishing 
emissions additionality: 
The Czech Republic guidelines state that: 
Evidence must be given that a significant reduction of enuss1ons of 
greenhouse gases (at least 10%) per unit of the final production in 
comparison with the initial state (baseline) will occur through: 
the replacement or modification of existing technology or possibly any of its 
parts; 
the addition to the existing technology of" end of pipe" equipment (such as 
denitrification, waste gas incineration, trapping of volatile organic 
compounds) (Ministry of Environment of the Czech Republic 1997). 
The World Bank and the government of Switzerland are assisting potential host 
countries in formulating National AIJ/JI Strategy Studies, which could include 
developing national emissions baselines. The study for the Czech Republic 
emissions and marginal abatement modelled "mild" and "fast" economic growth 
reference scenarios. The cost curves developed for the study could be used as an 
aid for evaluating whether a particular proposed project would reduce emissions 
beyond the reference case scenarios Goint Implementation Quarterly, 1997b). 
The United States AIJ technical evaluation process generally assumes that the 
project developer will assess the overall technical and economic feasibility of a 
project, and therefore concerns itself mainly with the greenhouse gas and specific 
AI] aspects of proposed projects. 
The US Initiative Joint Implementation distinguishes between emissions 
additionality and project additionality. Emissions additionality means that the 
emission reductions would not have taken place in the absence of the AIJ project. 
Project additionality asks project proponents to demonstrate that the project itself 
would not have occurred in the absence of the AI] programme. 
Given the lack of strong incentives to overcome the many obstacles to AIJ 
projects, it is hardly surprising that project developers complain about the 
additionality requirements of the pilot phase. Comments include the fact that 
"additionality gets in the way of projects; it is not clearly defined and hard to 
prove," and that "if a project is additional, it probably won't pass the business 
rationality test and our company won't have any reason to invest in it" (Trexler 
and Associates 1997). 
5.3.5.2 Illustrations from South Africa 
Defining the appropriate baseline for the Hot Water for Lwandle project 
illustrates the problems with emissions additionality. 
The historical baseline for heating water in the hostels in Lwandle would have to be 
calculated based on the fuels that have been used over a representative time 
period prior to the initiation of the AIJ project (see Figure 10). Residents of the 
Lwandle hostels have been using paraffin and-gas stoves to heat water for about 
the last ten years. Monthly data on paraffin and gas use, if available, would 
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Figure 10. Baselines and additionality 
The baseline reference case is what would likely occur in the absence of an AIJ 
project. Many of the hostels being upgraded in the national Hostels to Homes 
project are installing electrical in-line heaters because they have the lowest up-
front cost of the available options. Assuming this practice continues, a static 
reference case could be calculated using the number of heaters, the estimated 
annual electricity consumption of each heater and the estimated emissions per 
unit of electricity. 
A dynamic baseline would have to consider possible changes in hot water 
consumption in the hostels, as well as possible changes in the emissions per unit 
of electricity produced. Consumption might rise if more people start using the 
ablution facilities, if each person uses more hot water because the electricity 
supply is more convenient, or people start washing clothes in hot water. 
Emissions per unit of electricity might also fall in the future if Eskom introduces 
new clean coal technology. 
5.3.5.3 Input from the workshops 
Participants discussed the challenges of coping with baselines and project 
additionality in the context of the Lwandle hostels project. The Lwandle project 
developer explained that the prospect of AI] financing was part of the motivation 
to help the Lwandle community pursue solar water heating rather than electric in-
line water heating. Confusion arose because his efforts and action by the Lwandle 
community moved more quickly than the process for submitting and evaluating 
the AIJ proposal. The community may, in the end, overcome the barriers and 
obtain financing before receiving AIJ approval or financial assistance. When asked 
whether they thought the Lwandle project would meet a strict additionality 
criterion, participants recognised the complex and somewhat arbitrary nature of 
deciding baselines. Participants were in favour, rather, of standardised 
international methodologies for baselines which would put all projects on an even 
playing field. 
5.3.5.4 Analysis and recommendations 
Unless the Parties to the Convention modify rules for the AIJ, South Africa and 
other countries will have to contend with additionality in their AIJ evaluation 
process. Some participants in the AIJ debate have argued that the additionality 
criterion would no longer be necessary if all countries adopted binding emissions 
budgets, since in that case all emissions would be accounted for. Negotiators in 
Kyo to disagreed, however, so the Kyo to Protocol retains the additionality 
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requirement even for emissions trading among Annex I countries,3 all of which 
are taking on binding emissions reductions targets. The Protocol also retains the 
additionality requirement under the new Clean Development Mechanism for 
certified emission reduction from Al]-type activities with non-Annex I countries 
beyond the year 2000. 
By motivating the Lwandle community to implement a more environmentally 
friendly method for heating water even before being offidally declared an AIJ 
project, the project accomplishes AIJ' s ultimate objective: reducing emissions and 
promoting sustainable development. The South African AIJ programme should 
consider the motivation and intent of the project proposals when considering this 
"additionality" criteria. 
Recommendations: 
• South Africa should develop national emissions reference scenarios, similar to 
those developed for the Czech Republic (see experience from other countries, 
above). The mitigation section of the Climate Change Country Study should 
utilise the most up-to-date methodologies accepted by the IPCC and UNFCC 
to ensure that the results can be used in AIJ/JI decisions. If JI-relevant national 
baselines are beyond the scope of the Country Study, the NCCC should 
consider seeking funding from the World Bank-Swiss initiative described 
above to develop them. 
• Given the substantial implications for the value of certified emission 
reductions, South African stakeholders should play an active role in the 
debates on baselines and additionality leading up to the Conference of the 
Parties in late 1998. While baselines can quickly become a technical debate, 
South Africa should emphasise the original motivation for the additionality 
requirements-- to encourage incremental, real and measurable shifts from 
"business as usual" development to low greenhouse gas development paths. 
• Given that the ultimate objective of AIJ is to reduce emissions and support 
sustainable development, that the objective of the pilot phase is to experiment 
with the AIJ/JI mechanism, and that there are no credits during the pilot 
phase, the South African AIJ programme should take a flexible approach to 
the additionality criterion during the pilot phase of AIJ. 
• The programme should take a more stringent approach to additionality for 
any projects submitted after the pilot phase which would acquire certified 
emissions reductions under the CDM after 2000. The programme should 
distinguish between Activities Implemented Jointly (without credits) and 
future Joint Implementation (with credits) or clean development projects that 
help Annex I countries meet their commitments under the Protocol. 
5.3.6 Monitoring and verification 
Berlin criteria 
[Projects must have] ... real, measurable and long-term environmental 
benefits related to the mitigation of climate change ... 
Kyoto Protocol 
[Projects must have] ... real, measurable, and long-term benefits related to 
the mitigation of climate change ... 
The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this 
Protocol shall, at its first session, elaborate modalities and procedures with 
the objectives of ensuring transparency, effidency and accountability 
through independent auditing and verification of project activities. 
(Articles 12.5b and 12. 7) 
3 Annex I countries are those which agreed to emissions reductions under the 
UNFCCC. See glossary for more information. 
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South Africa's position on AIJ 
AIJ projects must contribute to the achievement of the objective of the 
UNFCCC by aiming to bring about . . . real, measurable and long-term 
environmental benefits related to the mitigation of climate change .... 
Monitoring is essential for measuring the actual emissions of an AIJ project 
relative to the baseline reference case. National AIJ institutions may also wish to 
monitor other indicators of project performance, such as local environmental, 
economic and social impacts. While project participants may monitor projects 
themselves, the Protocol requires independent verification of emissions 
reductions to ensure the system's integrity. Private sector firms involved in 
certification see a business opportunity in JI and COM verification, and several 
have already launched business development activities. 
5.3.6.1 Experience from other countries 
The Costa Rican proposal guidelines require that AIJ projects, particularly those 
linked to CTO' s, have a monitoring plan which includes the participation of 
organisations "capable of successfully monitoring the project." The monitoring 
plans should include actual measurements of the project's emissions or 
sequestration, and ask whether a third party will be able to verify the emissions 
(Figures, C et.al1996). 
5.3.6.2 Illustration from South Africa 
The Gugulethu Eco-Homes project included a monitoring proposal in the 
submission to USIJI. The developers stated that, in addition to the project 
developers, independent local organisations would be involved in monitoring the 
project's benefits, although they did not specify the organisations. Household 
sampling, with statistically significant sample sizes, will be used to collect data 
from the year prior to construction and regularly thereafter (Community of 
Guguletu 1997). The difficulty that this project faces, however, is that the USI]I 
does not fund monitoring activities (although USIJI only requires participants to 
monitor emissions reductions). The IIEC has asked Eskom to support monitoring. 
5.3.6.3 Input from workshops 
Participants thought that a range of local impacts should be monitored, but they 
recognised that extensive monitoring requirements would increase costs and 
potentially discourage investors. They suggested that the pilot phase should be a 
time to test a variety of monitoring schemes. One government representative felt 
that the incentives for both investors and host countries to inflate claimed 
reductions in emission makes third-party verification necessary. 
Participants acknowledged that willingness to pay for verification and the interest 
in verification methods would both increase with the market value of emissions 
credits. In a mature market, verification might become as routine as financial 
audits . 
5.3.6.4 Analysis and recommendations 
Investors and project developers are reluctant to pay for monitoring during the 
pilot phase, because they cannot claim credit for the emission reductions, no 
matter how well monitored. Pilot phase monitoring experiments must build the 
necessary empirical knowledge base for certifying creditable reductions in the 
future, so funding for monitoring is an investment in the future viability of the JI 
mechanism. 
Research projects on AIJ in South Africa, such as the one initiated by EDRC and 
ECON, a Norwegian policy research firm, should also contribute to 
understanding and fulfilling monitoring needs. 
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[Projects must have] ... real, measurable, and long-term benefits related to 
the mitigation of climate change. 
Article 12.5 (b) 
South Africa's position on AIJ 
AIJ projects must contribute to the achievement of the objective of the 
UNFCCC by aiming to bring about . . . long-term environmental benefits 
related to the mitigation of climate change ... . 
Investors and host countries ahke have an interest in securing the integrity of their 
emissions reductions over the life of the project. A major concern raised in 
international debates over AIJ and JI is how to guarantee that investments which 
reduce emissions will actually last as long as the project developers claim. 
5.3. 7.1 Experience from other countries 
Costa Rica and Poland both attempt to address the issue of durability by ensuring 
that project developers and implementing organisations have a sound track 
record and are economically viable (CC:INFO/ AIJ 1997). Poland also asks 
whether the site chosen is the one which has the most chance of succeeding. 
United States and Honduras Proposals to the USIJI must include a discussion of 
factors that could cause the reductions to be lost or reversed in the future and 
indicate what steps would be taken to address these risks. A major risk in 
technology-switching projects is that the technology will fail, causing users to 
revert to the old technology. Enersol, a US organisation specialising in rural solar 
electrification, emphasises training to develop the human infrastructure needed to 
ensure the durability of the technology switch. Enersol' s AIJ project in Honduras 
includes training local technicians to install and maintain the solar electrical 
equipment, reducing the likelihood that users will switch back to kerosene 
(Kaufman. S 199S). 
5.3. 7.2 Illustration from South Africa 
All of the AIJ proposals in South Africa have made assumptions about the length 
of time over which emissions reductions will occur. The emissions calculations in 
the Gugulethu Eco-Homes proposal, for example, assume that the measures will 
reduce emissions for SO years (Community of Guguletu 1997). 
5.3. 7.3 Input from workshops 
Participants pointed out several risks related to durability: 
• that investors would not provide adequate maintenance or re-investment; 
• that investors would maintain a project against the interests of the community 
in order to preserve their emissions reductions. Long-term contracts to 
preserve forest lands, for example, could deny South Africa valuable resource 
options; 
• that changes and instability in South African society would threaten project 
durability. 
5.3.7.4 Analysis and recommendations 
Even after the UNFCCC has prescribed general procedures for developing 
baselines and emissions reductions projections, national programmes will have to 
evaluate whether a project proposal has assessed the local context realistically. For 
instance, the energy efficiency and passive solar measures in the Guguletu Eco-
Homes may not endure SO years, as the proposal estimates, if residents make 
structural modifications. 
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Recommendation 
The South African AIJ institution should invite experts in the project type 
(housing, public transport, industrial energy efficiency) to assess whether a 
proposal's assumptions about temporal durability are realistic in the local context. 
5.3.8 Financial additionality 
Berlin criteria 
[Financing of activities implemented jointly shall be additional to the 
financial obligations of the parties ... as well as to current official 
development assistance. 
Kyoto Protocol 
[Industrialised country parties shall] provide new and additional financial 
resources to meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing country 
Parties in advancing the implementation of existing commitments. 
(Article 11 b) 
The Clean Development Mechanism shall assist in arranging funding of 
certified project activities as necessary. (Article 12.6) 
South Africa's position on AIJ 
Funding for AIJ projects should be additional to all existing funding and 
technology transfer. 
The Financial Additionality criterion was included to prevent industrialised 
countries from diverting development assistance toward AIJ, or from reducing 
previous obligations to contribute to the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The 
GEF is the designated interim financial mechanism of the UNFCCC and cannot be 
used to fund AIJ projects. 
The UNFCCC Uniform Reporting Format for AIJ asks governments to report the 
total cost of each project, and then to disaggregate the "AIJ components" of the 
project (UNFCCC 1996). Some projects that received Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) or GEF funds, or that would have been implemented under 
business as usual, have still reported an AIJ component added on to the project. 
5.3.8.1 Experience from other countries 
Costa Rica's proposal guidelines ask whether the project developer states the AIJ 
financial component (in US dollars) of the project and whether the proposal shows 
financial projections with and without the AIJ additional financial contribution 
(CC:INFO/ AIJ 1997). 
Czech Republic's AIJ rules exclude from AIJ any investments of foreign 
companies in their Czech subsidiaries (Ministry of the Environment of the Czech 
Republic nd). 
5.3.8.2 Illustration from South Africa 
The USIJI is providing a grant to fund some feasibility research and proposal 
preparation for the Clean Commute project (Scholand 1998). The question is 
whether this money is "additional'' given that US official development assistance 
is declining, and that the US has not fulfilled all of its other financial obligations 
under the Convention. 
5.3.8.3 Input from workshops 
Discussions concentrated on clarifying the interpretation of the financial 
additionality criterion, which applies only to governments, not the private sector. 
Participants, especially those developing proj~cts, had not understood that the 
financial additionality rule is meant to keep government from diverting or 
decreasing aid funds, not to censure the private sector. 
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5.3.8.4 Analysis and recommendation 
A host country AIJ programme will have difficulty determining whether AIJ 
funding is actually additional to all existing funding and technology transfer. 
Parties to the Convention have devoted considerable energy to debating North-
South resource transfers. In 1992, countries at the Rio Earth Summit agreed that 
industrialised countries would devote 0.7% of their gross domestic product to 
foreign aid. The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol both say that the industrialised 
countries will pay the incremental costs the developing countries incur to comply 
with the Convention. Few industrialised countries have fulfilled these 
commitments. Indeed, some countries, notably the United States, have cut their 
foreign aid budgets since 1992. 
Developing countries in some regions, such as Central and South America, have 
successfully gained access to climate change resources by co-operating at a 
regional level to push industrialised countries to live up to their UNFCCC 
commitments. 
Recommendations 
• Rather than focusing on the domestic reasons for dechning Northern aid 
budgets, South Africa should form alliances with other developing countries 
to hold the industrialised countries accountable for their specific 
commitments under the UNFCCC. 
• South Africa and its allies should develop detailed, constructive negotiating 
positions on support for institutional AIJ capacity, as well as for project 
development. Positions on AIJ and the Clean Development Mechanism 
should be integrated into proposals for South Africa's overall climate change 




That no credits shall accrue to any Party as a result of greenhouse gas 
emissions reduced or sequestered during the pilot phase from activities 
implemented jointly. 
Kyoto Protocol 
Parties included in Annex I may use the certified enuss10n reductions 
accruing from [JI] activities to contribute to compliance with part of their 
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments .... 
(Article 12.3b) 
Certified emission reductions obtained during the period from the year 
2000 up to the beginning of the first commitment period [2008-2012] can be 
used to assist in achieving compliance in the first commitment period. 
(Article 12.10) 
South Africa's Position on AIJ 
South Africa supports AIJ as a defined, finite phase and notes that the 
ending or continuation of AIJ will be evaluated by the year 2000. The terms 
of participation during the subsequent JI phase will be based upon a 
national position on JI or any alternative; such a national policy will be 
formulated in due course. 
To summarise, the Berhn Criteria do not allow credits during the pilot phase, 
which was to be evaluated no later than 2000. The Kyo to Protocol ruled that 
Annex I parties may earn credit towards their emissions reduction targets from Jl 
projects with other Annex I parties starting in 2000. Emissions reduction credits 
from the Clean Development Mechanism (that is, projects with developing 
countries) which occur after 2000 can also be applied toward meeting targets. 
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The US private sector has indicated that crediting would dramtically increase the 
interest in AIJ or JI. In the words of one potential investor, "If credits were 
awarded to firms who purchased carbon offsets, it would open the floodgate of JI 
participation" (Trexler and Associates 1997). 
5.3.9.2 Illustration from South Africa 
Iscor Steel and Hoogovens signed letters of intent to explore jointly implemented 
emissions reductions. The agreements state Hoogovens' interest in acquiring C02 
credits to help meet domestic commitments in the Netherlands. The agreements 
indicate that Hoogovens would receive SO% of the validated emissions reductions. 
The draft intergovernmental Memorandum of Understanding, however, clearly 
states that the quantified reductions "cannot function as credits" during the pilot 
phase (Minist~r for Development Cooperation of the Netherlands 1998). 
5.3.9.3 Analysis and recommendations 
The inability to earn emissions credits in the pilot phase means that the emissions 
reductions have virtually no commercial value. Several studies have identified the 
lack of monetised value for credits as the primary barrier to AIJ projects (see, for 
example, Trexler and Associates (1997)). Without financially valuable credits the 
private sector has no direct economic incentive to undertake AIJ projects that are 
not profitable in their own right. For instance, the International Utility Efficiency 
Partnership of the US Edison Electric Institute requires commercially competitive 
rates of return for its AIJ portfoho (Shiflet 1997). 
Recommendations 
• The South African AIJ programme will have to develop a position on the 
Kyoto Protocol Article 12.3(b) declaration that "Parties included in Annex I [ie 
those with emissions hmits] may use the certified emission reductions [under 
the CDM] . . . to contribute to comphance with part of their quantified 
emission hmitation and reduction commitments" starting in 2000 (Kyo to 
Protocol 1997). The programme should seek to maximise exploration of 
potential mechanisms during the AIJ pilot phase to inform South Africa's 
positions in future negotiations. 
• The programme should be careful not to commit South Africa to any credit-
sharing arrangement prior to the establishment of rules for the CDM. 
5.3. 10 Transparency 
South Africa's position on AIJ 
Transparency is essential in the evaluation of AIJ projects, the agreements 
reached, and in the performance monitoring. 
Transparency means the opportunity for an outside party to examine the 
assumptions or the decision-making process involved in a project. In the case of 
AIJ, project developers want to be able to track the project evaluation process and 
understand the reasons behind government approvals or rejections. National and 
international bodies have a similar interest in the transparency of project 
arrangements, including legal agreements among project participants that affect 
state interests. All AIJ project stakeholders want to hold project participants and 
evaluators accountable for their actions, and transparent access to information is a 
key to accountability. 
5.3.10.1 Experience from other countries 
Other countries' AIJ programmes do not have exphcit transparency requirements 
although their evaluation procedures are in many cases designed to address it 
(CC:INFO/ AIJ 1997). In some cases, national legislation on the pubhc's "right-to-
know" takes precedence over any rules or procedures specific to AIJ. 
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Netherlands To address the potential conflict between proprietary business 
information about AIJ projects and the pubhc' s interest in transparency, the 
Netherlands has estabhshed the Joint Implementation Registration Centre (JIRC). 
The JIRC is an arm's-length agency which, it is hoped, will be considered 
sufficiently independent by industry so that it can verify the technical and 
economic details of AIJ and Jl projects (Kant 1997). 
5.3.10.2 Illustration from South Africa 
The agreement between Hoogovens and Iscor states that the detailed report on 
the project feasibility study will be subject to a secrecy declaration. The project 
participants will prepare a pubhc version censored for proprietary information. 
This secrecy was questioned initially by members of the AIJ Working Group. The 
Netherlands AI] programme, however, responded that the JIRC and their 
counterpart in South Africa would have the right to investigate and analyse all 
data relating to the project, to visit the sites and to monitor the improvements if 
they wish to do so (Kant 1997). 
5.3.10.3 Input from workshops 
Participants discussed what aspects of projects need to be transparent to 
safeguard stakeholders and the integrity of emissions reductions. The project 
aspects discussed included: 
• negotiation procedures; 
• project management structure; 
• sources and uses of funding; 
• measurements and reporting of emissions reductions; 
• costs of emissions reductions; 
• evaluation process. 
Workshop participants recognised the private sector's need to maintain the 
confidentiahty of proprietary information, but also the project community's right 
to know about actions affecting them and their interests. 
Recommendations 
• The South African AIJ programme should prepare a standard confidentiahty 
agreement for those with access to financial or sensitive technical information 
in project proposals and other confidential project documentation. 
• In all evaluation procedures, the programme should follow the South African 
government' s pohcies for transparency and pubhc disclosure of information. 
• If South Africa decides to conduct its own monitoring activities, the 
programme should study the experience of other countries on how to 
maintain transparency concurrent with needed confidentiahty. 
5.3.11 Capacity building and technology transfer 
The Berlin criteria do not refer to capacity building or technology transfer as such, 
although the Framework Convention includes provisions for both that 
presumably apply to AIJ. Developing countries have expressed concern 
throughout the negotiations that industrialised countries have not hved up to 
their capacity building and technology transfer commitments (Chmate Network 
Africa 1995, Maya 1997). The UNFCCC Uniform Reporting Format for AI], 
developed after the Berhn criteria, asks countries to report on both issues. 
Negotiations in Kyoto placed several provisions for capacity building and 
technology transfer in the Protocol text. The Clean Development Mechanism, 
estabhshed under Article 12, is subject to these provisions as one mechanism for 
implementing the Protocol: 
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Kyoto Protocol 
[Parties shall] ... co-operate in the promotion of effective modahties for the 
development, apphcation and diffusion of, and take all practicable steps to 
promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, 
environmentally sound technologies, know-how, practices and processes pertinent 
to climate change, in particular to developing countries .... 
(Article 10c) 
promote at the international level . . . the development and 
implementation of education and training programmes, including the 
strengthening of national capacity building, in particular human and 
institutional capacities and the exchange or secondment of personnel to 
train experts in this field, in particular for developing countries. 
(Article 10) 
[Industrialised parties shall] ... provide such financial resources, including 
for the transfer of technology, needed by the developing country Parties to 
meet the agreed full incremental costs of advancing the implementation of 
existing commitments. 
(Article 11.2) 
The South African NCCC emphasised the instrumental role of capacity building 
in developing effective rules for future JI regimes: 
South Africa's position on AIJ 
The AIJ pilot phase must be used to develop capacity in South Africa so 
that full local understanding of issues relating to the implementation of the 
UNFCCC is achieved. This enhanced understanding will improve South 
Africa's ability to judge the potential positive or negative impacts of a 
foreseen crediting mechanism and future resource requirements. 
5.3.11.1 Experience from other countries 
Thailand requires endogenous capacity building as an integral part of projects, 
while the Netherlands requires a training component for authorities or companies 
in the host country in project proposals (Plamphongsant 1997, Ministry of 
Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment 1997). In contrast, Poland's AIJ 
criteria declare that only projects involving the transfer of technological hardware, 
or of financial resources to procure technologies and equipment, will be endorsed 
as JI projects. Projects which include only technical assistance, education, or 
training, are considered valuable forms of assistance but they will not be accepted 
as JI projects (CC:INFO/ AIJ 1997). 
In Africa, the Kadoma Workshop statement suggests that equipment should carry 
a warranty and spare parts for the life of the project (Maya and Gupta 1996). 
The United States Government had initiated a "Chmate Technology Co-operation 
Framework Pilot Project" which seeks to help specific countries identify priorities 
and develop plans to implement sustainable energy technologies. The project will 
hold stakeholder workshops with representatives from "recipient countries" 
(Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, India, Kazakhstan and the Philippines), development 
organisations, the renewable energy and energy efficiency industries, US Federal 
agencies and technical advisors. The country teams present their technology 
priorities to the other participants and discuss opportunities for complementary 
collaborative actions by countries, donors and the private sector. The US National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory will help countries refine their plans and seek to 
implement their top priorities (Chmate Technology Cooperation Pilot Project 
1997). 
5.3.11.2 Illustration from South Africa 
The Iscor-Hoogovens project will train plant operators in II good-housekeeping" 
measures to improve energy efficiency. If new technologies or processes are 
introduced, Iscor personnel will be trained to operate or implement them. Iscor 
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personnel will build their skills through dialogue with Hoogovens during the 
feasibility study (Kant 1997). 
5.3.11.3 Input from workshops 
Capadty building was a major concern in the workshops. A government 
representative reported that capadty building for Africans has been raised 
repeatedly in international meetings about AIJ. Partidpants said the AIJ 
programmes must not allow foreign consultants to establish projects and leave the 
country without properly training South Africans to maintain the project. 
Partidpants distinguished between developing broad public awareness of AIJ 
issues and building skills around specific AIJ projects. The latter would train 
South Africans, for example, in designing energy-cost-optimised homes, planning 
trip reduction programmes, installing and maintaining solar water-heaters, or 
operating steel plants to minimise energy use. For the former, an industry 
representative noted that the South African Country Study is meant to include 
capadty building to familiarise stakeholders with climate change issues. 
Partidpants from NGO's subsequently indicated that capadty building was surely 
neglected by the NCCC. 
The discussion linked capadty building and technology transfer, noting the value 
of transferring skills and methods in addition to simple hardware. Partidpants 
discussed what "technology transfer" actually meant, since it can cover 
everything from turnkey operations to training. For technological hardware, 
espedally large-scale technologies such as nuclear power, to be transferred 
successfully, the project must develop the appropriate human infrastructure. 
Partidpants said AIJ must not subsidise "dumping" of inappropriate technologies, 
noting previous development boondoggles that left malfunctioning expensive or 
even dangerous technologies in their wake. A government representative was 
concerned that foreign firms might dump out-dated or inappropriate technologies 
because they do not want to help potential competitors. If approached 
strategically AIJ could present opportunities for South Africa to develop and 
transfer her own technologies to other developing countries. 
5.3.11.4 Analysis and recommendations 
Technology transfer is linked to capadty building. Investigations into the critical 
factors behind long-term improvements in industrial effidency have concluded 
that increased human skills ("disembodied technical change") account for success 
more than upgraded physical capital stock ("embodied technical change") Gepma 
& Munasighe 1998). 
Recommendation 
• South Africa should seek to synchronise acquisition of physical technology 
with building human resources and institutions. South Africa negotiators 
should argue that investment in increased human skills is crudal for an AIJ 
project's success, and to the value and durability of emissions reduction 
credits. 
Article 10 (c) of the Kyoto Protocol distinguishes between transfer of technology 
in the public domain, and access to technology in the private domain. So far the 
Parties have not created the right incentives for the private sector to transfer state-
of-the-art technology hardware or skills. 
Recommendation 
• To gain access to new technologies and capadty, the South Africa AIJ and 
climate change programmes must include well-designed creating incentives 
for private industry to act. South Africa could apply to partidpate in bilateral 
technology co-operation agreements, such as the US Technology Co-operation 
Frameworks project, as one avenue for technology transfer, although South 
Africa must first make significant progress· on its Country Study and National 
Action Plan. 
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5.3. 12 Environmental. social and economic benefits and/or 
negative impacts 
The UNFCCC Uniform Reporting Format asks countries to report on environmental, 
social, cultural, and economic costs and benefits from activities implemented 
jointly projects. The format stipulates that whenever possible, quantitative 
information should be provided. 
Kyoto Protocol 
The Conference of the Parties . . . shall ensure that a share of the proceeds 
from certified project activities is used to cover administrative expenses as 
well as to assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable 
to the adverse effects of climate change to meet the cost of adaptation. 
(Article 12.8). The Protocol declares that developing countries "will benefit" 
from projects under the COM, but does not mention how project benefits 
should be allocated to project participants. 
5.3.12.1 Experience from other countries 
Costa Rica requires project proposals to account for all of the economic benefits 
associated with the project, as well as address the sharing of those benefits. 
Poland's AIJ criteria will not allow projects which decrease local environmental 
quality, while the Czech Republic says that projects must actually bring about 
additional positive environmental impacts and contribute to infrastructure 
development and employment (CC:INFO/ AIJ 1997, Ministry for theEnvironment 
of the Czech Repubhc nd). 
5.3.12.2 Illustration from South Africa 
The proposal for the Clean Commute Project outlines the potential negative and 
positive impacts of the project (IIEC Transport Program 1997), which will: 
• save money by reducing the cost of commuting; 
• reduce the number of motor vehicle trips made to and from the business park, 
thus reducing traffic congestion and the rate of energy consumption; 
• promote technology co-operation by establishing a programmatic framework 
for the introduction of new technologies, including geographic information 
systems, trip reduction program software, commuter vans, and 
telecommunications technologies and workstations; 
• decrease air pollution from motor vehicles; 
• increase flexibility of employees using pubhc transport to work, but decrease 
flexibility of employees who were using single occupant vehicles; 
• increase worker productivity by getting employees to work on time, with less 
stress; 
• decrease taxi violence and the rate of crime suffered by employees driving to 
and from work alone. 
In terms of the distribution of benefits and funding for the AIJ proposals, the bulk 
of pre-feasibility and feasibility funds for all four AIJ case studies will go to 
consultants and project developers (IIEC, Energy Transformations, MIDTRAN, 
and Hoogovens). Funds for materials will purchase a mix of foreign technologies 
(eg pay-as-you use water meters, trip reduction software) and local goods and 
services ( eg insulation, construction labour, vanpool drivers) (IIEC Transport 
Program 1997, Netherlands Energy Research Foundation 1997, Kant 1997). 
Project implementation funds for the four projects will come from both inside 
South Africa (eg housing subsidies) and outside (eg Hoogevens). 
5.3.12.3 Input from workshops 
Participants said local effects had to take precedence over global effects. AIJ 
projects must identify the significantly affected local parties, such as the paraffin 
or coal merchants who would lose business after their customers switched to 
cleaner fuels. They agreed the South Africa AIJ programme must require project 
developers to mitigate any negative local impacts as a condition for approval. An 
industry representative said environmental impacts would be identified and 
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addressed in the required environmental impact study, but some environmental 
NGOs countered that many projects in South Africa are still going forward 
without proper impact studies. 
5.3.12.4 Analysis and recommendations 
Addressing impacts outside a pr<?ject' s main focus is problematic for any type of 
project, not just AIJ. Many development debates focus on how to avoid or 
minimise negative impacts. These debates have already led to requirements for 
environmental impact assessments, local planning hearings, offsetting donations, 
or similar measures. 
Recommendations 
• The South African AIJ programme should ask project developers to detail the 
local social, environmental and economic impacts of the project. 
• South Africa should integrate AIJ into existing frameworks for addressing the 
impacts of foreign investment and development, and not invent a separate 
policy infrastructure. The South Africa AIJ programme should not approve 
projects that do not comply with local requirements. 
















6. AIJ institutions 
Effective institutional structures are necessary to carry out the nusston and 
objectives of the AIJ programme and apply the evaluation criteria. This section 
analyses the functions and actors that would comprise a South African AIJ 
institutional structure, and recommends strategies for developing and funding 
that structure. 
6.1 Functions and actors 
Based on the experience of other countries' AIJ/JI programmes, and the work of 
the Center for Sustainable Development in the Americas contained in the manual 
Implementing Jl/AIJ; A Guide for Establishing Joint Implementation Programs, EDRC 
identified the key functions which an AIJ institution will have to perform 
(Figueres, C. et. al 1996, CC:INFO/ AIJ 1997). The functions are pohcy making, 
planning and implementation. 
6. 1.1 Policy 
• Define overall AIJ goals and pohcy strategies, within the context of other 
relevant pohcy processes. 
• Integrate AIJ pohcy with other environmental, economic and social pohcies. 
• Formulate AIJ and JI positions for international negotiations. 
• Represent South Africa's AIJ interests in international fora. 
• Develop AIJ criteria and overall guidehnes for evaluation. 
• Take final responsibility for decisions on proposed projects. 
6.1 .2 Planning 
• Estabhsh project proposal guidehnes and format. 
• Determine and oversee proposal evaluation process. 
• Estabhsh procedures for sohciting, receiving, assessing and taking decisions 
on proposals. 
• Recommend decisions on project approval. 
• Define procedures for monitoring and verification. 
6. 1.3 Day-to-day operations 
• Disseminate information (procedures, pohcies, etc). 
• Sohcit and evaluate (or co-ordinate evaluation of) proposals. 
• Oversee monitoring and verification. 
• Prepare annual reports for the UNFCCC . 
• Register emissions reductions. 
6. 1.4 Additional functions 
Depending on the objectives for the programme and the resources available, the 
South African programme should also consider whether and how to provide 
further assistance with project development: 
• Capacity building for NGOs, CBO's and (small) business. 
• Assistance with proposal preparation. 
• Proactive project identification. 
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• Marketing the AIJ programme and accepted projects to potential investors. 
6. 1.5 Actors in South Africa 
The AIJ Working Group of the NCCC, with support from the Weather Bureau's 
Special Uaison office, is currently performing almost all of these functions. The 
Working Group consists of two industry representatives from the NCCC, and two 
government representatives from DME and the Weather Bureau. As discussed in 
the policy context section, climate change policy is formulated by the DEA T under 
the advice of an interdepartmental co-ordinating committee and with stakeholder 
input from the NCCC. DEAT, therefore, is responsible for AIJ policy decisions. 
While the interdepartmental committee has not been directly active in many 
policy debates, representatives from other departments sit on the NCCC and have 
access to the DEAT chair of the committee. 
6.2 Experience from other countries 
Most countries which have established AIJ/JI programmes have a central co-
ordinating office, although these offices do not always play precisely the same 
role. While some of the industrialised country programmes have sizeable central 
staffs devoted to the whole range of functions, the co-ordinator in developing 
countries may have limited capacity or play mostly an informational role. 
Even the role of information clearinghouse and promoting the AIJ programme can 
have dramatic results. Poland's JI Secretariat, for example, published a list of 65 
project opportunities when the programme was still relatively young Goint 
Implementation Quarterly 1997a). While these projects may not yet be funded, 
they give some sense of the opportunity for being proactive. Costa Rica's national 
Jl office is more active than those in many developing countries, participating in a 
wide range of JI for a fora and negotiations, actively brokering JI projects, and 
developing relationships with potential funders (Figueres 1996). 
At a policy level, Costa Rica has also made a significant effort to integrate climate 
change and other sustainable development concerns into its national policies and 
institutions. President Figueres' government, for example, has actively promoted 
JI as a strategy to obtain funding for the National Conservation Strategy for 
Sustainable Development (LeBlanc 1997). 
The USA, Mexico and the Netherlands all have interdepartmental steering 
committees for JI to assist with co-ordinating AIJ and climate change policy with 
economic, natural resource, and energy policy and to get input from these sectors 
(CC:INFO/ AIJ 1997, Instituto Nacional de Ecologia 1997). These three countries 
also have JI registries, which track the emissions reductions associated with 
specific projects. One key reason why some industrialised countries are concerned 
with registries is that, although from AIJ emissions reductions may be reported to 
the UNFCCC, in the pilot phase they are not internationally certified. It is unclear 
whether these functions will be as important if the UNFCCC Secretariat or some 
other body becomes an international registry for future Jl or CDM projects. 
6.3 Workshop input and recommendations 
6.3.1 Policy 
Workshop participants suggested that the AIJ Working Group should provide the 
initial input for most of the policy functions. It would make recommendations to 
the full NCCC, which would in tum make recommendations to DEAT and the 
Inter-Departmental Committee. 
Recommendations 
• The AIJ Working Group should initiate AIJ policy development and make 
recommendations to the NCCC and DEA T on all AIJ policy issues. 
• The AIJ Working Group, the NCCC and .the DEAT should ensure that AIJ 
policy recognises and provides input into other environmental, natural 
resource and energy policies. 
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6.3.2 Planning 
Participants generally agreed that the AIJ programme needed to clearly delineate 
functions and responsible parties, but they had concerns about who those parties 
should be. Industry representatives said the government had to provide 
leadership and good management, but they opposed adding to the size of the civil 
service. Industry supported drawing up terms of reference for an AIJ programme 
and contracting a private organisation to carry out the functions. Government 
representatives were in broad agreement, emphasising that the workload of 
supporting the AIJ Working Group was already too much for the allocated human 
resources. Workshop participants therefore suggested that the AI] Working 
Group should develop terms of reference for the planning functions and contract 
consultants to carry them out. The AIJ Working Group would review the 
consultants' work, and submit the results to the NCCC and DEAT as appropriate. 
Recommendation 
• The AIJ Working Group should develop terms of reference for the planning 
functions and contract consultants to carry them out. The AIJ Working Group 
should review the consultants' work, and submit the results to the NCCC and 
DEA T as appropriate. 
6.3.3 Day-to-day operations 
Participants indicated that the AIJ Co-ordinator, who might be a consultant, 
should disseminate information and prepare annual reports. The DEAT is 
responsible for submitting South Africa's annual national Communication to the 
UNFCC, so the AIJ Co-ordinator would report to DEA T in preparing the AIJ 
portion of the report. The AIJ Working Group would oversee proposal evaluation, 
and use a technical reference group as necessary to review greenhouse gas 
emissions estimates and other technical issues. 
Recommendations 
• The AIJ Working Group should develop a technical reference group of experts 
willing and able to review AI] proposals for their environmental and social 
impacts, but not their financial viability (which is up to the project 
developers). This could include other members of the NCCC. 
• The AIJ Working group, in consultation with the NCCC and DEAT, should 
draw up terms of reference for an AIJ Co-ordinator to perform the day-to-day 
functions of the AIJ Programme. This co-ordinator should be contracted 
directly to the DEAT, but report also to the NCCC 
• The South African AIJ programme should consider the benefits of a pro-active 
approach of identifying project opportunities that are feasible and desirable 
for AI], the CDM or future JI, and promoting their development. 
• South Africa can conserve institutional resources by utilising other existing 
policy infrastructures. For example, evaluators of AIJ proposals should take 
advantage of the environmental impact assessments (EIAs) that will be 
required for all construction starting from April, 1998 (Shevel 1998). The 
program should also encourage AIJ proponents to consider AIJ issues when 
preparing EIAs, to avoid duplication of effort. 
6.3.4 Representation and expertise 
Some participants emphasised the need to involve mainly experts on climate 
change policy and technical issues in policy and planning decisions, while others 
focused more on the need for representatives of various stakeholder groupings. 
Participants noted that larger committees tend to be less efficient, but that clear 
criteria and processes could mitigate conflicts between size and efficiency. 
Industry representatives reminded participants that some AIJ functions would be 
incorporated into standard business practice !£ AIJ moved forward to JI, which 
would decrease the burden on the AIJ institution. In the near term the AIJ 
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institution should help the private sector build capacity to incorporate AIJ 
considerations. 
Recommendations 1 
• If the role of the AIJ Working Group is. to initiate policy development, as well 
as set the direction for planning and operation of the programme, then 
adequate stakeholder representation is important. The NCCC as a whole is 
meant to be an important advisory body for stakeholder input on climate 
change policy, and the AIJ Working Group must be the same for AIJ and Jl 
issues. 
• Representation and expertise need not be mutually exclusive; a representative 
of low-income community's housing interests is likely to be familiar with low-
income housing. Since South Africa's AIJ criteria will cover a range of 
technical, social and economic issues, the South African AIJ institution should 
organise itself to call on a range of stakeholders and experts, to participate in 
evaluating project proposals as needed. 
6.4 Funding the programme 
The UNFCCC and Kyo to Protocol contain proVISions to fund developing 
countries' costs of compliance with the Convention, including "enabling 
activities". Article 12 of the Protocol, which established the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), stipulates that a portion of proceeds from certified project 
activities must be channelled to the defray administrative costs of the programme. 
There is a risk, however, that if host countries fail to organise themselves, the 
funds for administrative expenses could all be appropriated by whatever 
international body establishes itself as the CDM "executive board" . 
To date Annex II Parties under the Convention (the industrialised countries with 
financial commitments) have provided varying levels and types of support for 
enabling activities. Multilateral organisations such as the United Nations 
Environment Programme, the World Bank and the International Energy Agency 
have also funded activities. 
Recommendations 
• The AIJ Working Group should assign resources to investigate funding 
sources and write grants for seed funding for whatever AIJ institution is 
agreed to by the NCCC. If the NCCC decides to incorporate AIJ functions into 
a broader climate change institution, funding could be pursued for the whole 
package. 
• South Africa should argue in international negotiations and with funding 
institutions that the (preparatory) work to establish a host country AIJ 
institution is an activity which will enable the CDM (and future Jl) to function 
effectively, and that the investor countries should support it as such. 
• The NCCC should recommend co-operation with other host countries to 
negotiate for fulfilment of the Kyoto commitments for the CDM. The AIJ 
Working Group and NCCC should collaborate with other African countries to 
analyse the options for allocating funds from the CDM to defray 
administrative expenses under Article 12.8 of the Kyoto Protocol, and develop 
joint negotiating positions. 










7. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
South Africa's current position on AIJ declares South Africa's intention to 
participate in the pilot phase. The recommendations in this report are designed to 
help South Africa maximise the potential benefits from AIJ and the CDM and 
minimise the risks. The AIJ programme presented in this report is a set of 
institutional structures, policies and procedures which can guide AIJ in South 
Africa. Note that the detailed actions for the South Africa AIJ programme 
outlined in the section on "AIJ Issues and Criteria" are not repeated here, only the 
key recommendations. 
7.1 Mission 
The mission of the South African AIJ programme should be to evaluate the local 
and global impacts, both positive and negative, of AIJ projects to determine the 
conditions for equitable and effective activities implemented jointly under the 
Clean Development Mechanism. In addition, in the longer term the programme 
should facilitate foreign investment in projects which support South Africa's 
development objectives while reducing emissions of greenhouse gases. 
7.2 Objectives 
The objectives of the South African AIJ programme should be to: 
• maximise participation and learning during the pilot phase; 
• promote technology transfer and capacity building; 
• formulate strategies to encourage private sector participation; 
• contribute to methodologies for effectively measuring greenhouse gas 
emissions and sequestration. 
7.3 AIJ criteria 
The recommended criteria for AIJ projects are as follows. 
To be found acceptable as an Activity Implemented Jointly under the pilot phase, 
a project must: 
• be compatible with and supportive of national and local priorities; 
• contribute to cost-effectiveness in achieving global and national benefits; 
• generate reductions in emissions that are additional to any that would occur 
in the absence of the certified activity; 
• generate real, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of 
climate change; 
• if receiving financing from governments, only utilise financing that is 
additional to the financial obligations of the investor country under the 
UNFCCC, as well as to current official development assistance; 
• in accordance with the Berlin Criteria, not claim any credits toward emission 
limitation obligations during the pilot phase; 
• demonstrate transparency in aspects of project development and 
implementation that affect South Africa's other AIJ criteria; 
• contribute to building capacity and transferring sustainable and appropriate 
technology; 
• identify the significant local benefits and impacts of the proposed project and 
propose plans to mitigate any negative local impacts; 
• in the long run, address the issue of sharing the economic benefits of the 
project's greenhouse gas abatement. 
7.4 Institutional structure and process 
South Africa should integrate AIJ into ~xisting frameworks for energy, 
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should draw on existing resources within and outside of government, with a co-
ordinator managing the operations of the programme. 
7.4.1 The AIJ Working Group 
• The AIJ Working Group should initiate AIJ pohcy development and make 
recommendations to the NCCC and DEATon all AI] pohcy issues. 
• The AIJ Working Group, the NCCC and the DEAT should ensure that AIJ 
pohcy recognises and provides an input into other environmental, natural 
resource and energy pohcy. 
• In the capacity of initiating pohcy development, as well as setting the 
direction for planning and operation of the programme, adequate stakeholder 
representation and responsiveness in the AIJ Working Group is important. 
The NCCC as a whole serves an important advisory body for stakeholder 
input on chmate change pohcy, and the AIJ Working Group must provide the 
same for AIJ and JI issues. 
7.4.2 AIJ planning 
The AIJ Working Group should develop Terms of Reference for the planning 
functions (eg estabhshing proposal guidehnes and evaluation procedures) and 
contract consultants to carry them out. The AIJ Working Group would review the 
consultants' work, and submit the results to the NCCC and DEAT as appropriate. 
7.4.3 AIJ Co-ordinator 
The AIJ Working Group, in consultation with the NCCC and DEAT, should draw 
up Terms of Reference for an AIJ Co-ordinator to perform the day-to-day 
functions of the AIJ programme. This co-ordinator should be contracted directly 
to the DEA T, but report also to the NCCC. 
7.4.4 Evaluation process (shown in Figure 9) 
• Proposals should be submitted for evaluation to the AI] Working Group 
through the AIJ Co-ordinator. 
• The AIJ Working Group should develop a technical reference group of experts 
willing and able to review AIJ proposals for the environmental and social 
impacts, but not their financial viability (which is up to the project 
developers). This group could include other members of the NCCC. 
• Since South Africa's AIJ criteria will cover a range of technical, social and 
economic issues, the South African AIJ institution should invite experts in the 
project type (housing, pubhc transport, industrial energy efficiency) to assess 
the project proposal within the local context. 
South Africa has a window of opportunity to learn from its own and other 
countries' experience with the pilot phase so far, and to play an active role in 
shaping the post-2000 emissions crediting regimes. There are sufficiently large 
potential benefits and risks from AI] and the new Oean Development Mechanism 
to warrant a well-organised institutional approach of co-ordinated governmental 
and non-governmental activities. The recommendations presented here can lay 
the groundwork for an effective, transparent, and flexible AIJ programme. 
Experience from this programme will be a crucial input to South Africa's future 
position on emissions trading and broader chmate change pohcy. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Annex I Parties: 
The industrialised countries listed in this annex to the Convention must adopt 
measures aimed at returning their greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the 
year 2000 as per Article 4.2(a) and (b). They include the 24 original OECD 
members, 11 former members of the Soviet bloc, and the European Union. 
Annex II Parties: 
The wealthier countries listed in this annex to the Convention have a special 
obhgation to help developing countries with financial and technological resources. 
They include the 24 original OECD members plus the European Union. 
Article 4.1 of the FCCC: 
Contains general commitments for all Parties: developing and developed. 
Article 4.2: 
Contains specific commitments for developed country (Annex I) Parties only, 
notably to take measures aimed at returning greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 
levels by the year 2000. 
Banking and borrowing: 
The proposal that a country that reduces enuss10ns faster than required be 
allowed to make "extra" emissions in the future, while a country that fails to 
achieve its target must later reduce its emissions even further than would 
normally be required. 
Berlin Mandate: 
Decision 1 of COP 1, which concluded that the developed country commitment to 
take measures aimed at returning greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the 
year 2000 is inadequate. Talks to strengthen this commitment were launched 
within the Ad hoc Group on the Berhn Mandate. 
Conference of the Parties (COP): 
The COP is the supreme body of the Convention. It currently meets once a year to 
review the Convention's progress. The word "conference" is not used here in the 
sense of "meeting" but rather of a decision making body, which explains the 
seemingly redundant expression "first session of the Conference of the Parties". 
COP sessions: 
The first session of the Conference of the Parties (COP-1) was held in Berhn from 
28 March to 7 April1995, the second (COP-2) in Geneva from 8 -19 July 1996, the 
third (COP-3) will be held in Kyoto from 1-10 December 1997, and the fourth 
(COP:4) is expected in November 1998. 
Financial mechanism: 
As defined by the Convention its role is to transfer funds and technology to 
developing countries on a grant or consessional basis, under the guidance of the 
COP. The Global Environmental Facihty is "operating" the mechanism on an 
interim basis. 
Global Environment Facility (GEF): 
The multi-billion dollar GEF was established by the World Bank, the UN 
Development Programme, and the UN Environment Programme in 1990. It 
operates the Convention's "financial mechanism" on an interim basis and funds 
developing country projects that have global chmate change benefits. 
Greenhouse gases (GHG's): 
The major GHG's responsible for causing climate change are carbon dioxide 
(C02), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N20). 
Group of 77 and China: 
The G77 was founded in 1967 under the auspices of the United Nations 
Conference for Trade and Development (UNCT AD). It seeks to harmonise the 
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negotiating positions of its 132 developing country members. After including 
China the name was changed. 
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC): 
The INC met during five sessions between February 1991 and May 1992 to draft 
the Convention; in met six more times to prepare for COP.1 before completing its 
work in February 1995. 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC): 
The IPCC was established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organisation and 
the UN Environment Programme. It conducts rigorous surveys of the world-
wide technical and scientific hterature and publishes assessment reports that are 
widely recognized as the most credible existing sources of information on climate 
change. The IPCC also works on methodologies and responds to specific requests 
from the Convention's subsidiary bodies. 
National communications: 
A central requirement of the Convention is that each Party must inform the others 
about its national climate change activities. Developed countries are starting to 
submit their second reports and developing countries are starting to submit their 
first. 
OECD: 
The original 24 members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development are members of the WEOG (Western Europe and Others) regional 
group and include Austraha, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, the UK, and the US. The more recent OECD members: the Czech 
Repubhc, Hungary, Korea, Mexico, and Poland: are not members of WEOG. 
Party: 
A state (or regional economic integration organisation) that ratifies or accedes to 
the Convention becomes a Party 90 days later and thus legally bound by its 
provisions. 
Protocol: 
The Berhn Mandate calls for the negotiation of a protocol or another legal 
instrument "to add new, specific commitments to the Convention. Unhke an 
amendment to the existing Convention text, a protocol is a separate and 
additional agreement, although it is hnked to the original Convention. There is 
currently no agreement on voting procedures for a protocol should consensus not 
be possible, but voting is rarely used in environmental treaties. 
QELROs: 
Quantified Emissions Limitation and Reduction Objectives are targets and 
timetables. 
Ratification: 
After signing the Convention, a country's parhament or other designated body 
submits its instrument of ratification to the depository (the UN Secretary General) 
to start the 90:day countdown to becoming a Party. 
UNFCC Secretariat: 
Staffed by international civil servants and responsible for servicing the COP and 
ensuring its smooth operation, the secretariat makes arrangements for meetings, 
compiles and prepares reports, and co-ordinates with other relevant international 
bodies. The Chmate Change secretariat is administratively hnked to the United 
Nations. 
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Environmental Justice Networking Forum 
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South Africa's position on activities implemented jointly 
South Africa faces unique challenges in the reconstruction and development of its 
society and economy. To correct the inequalities of the past, major projects need 
to be executed very quickly. These include, amongst others, mass housin~ 
electrification, water provision and education programmes. This reconstruction 
and development also creates significant opportunities for the joint 
implementation of initiatives. 
South Africa supports the concept of Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) and is 
willing to participation in the AIJ pilot phase. Participation within the AIJ pilot 
phase is acceptable and considered beneficial for the following reasons: 
1. Valuable experience can be gained from taking part in this defined, finite, 
voluntary pilot phase. 
2. Experience gained during the AIJ phase may be used in the formulation of 
our policy on Joint lmplementation(JI). 
3. Most countries within the Africa Group, G77 & China, SADC and 
Valdivia, of which South Africa is a member, now support participation in 
AIJ projects. 
4. It is apparent from the project proposals already received by the South 
African Government, that AIJ projects could assist in the achievement of 
national development priorities. 
In South Africa's support of participation in the AIJ phase, the following 
conditions apply: 
5. AI] projects can be considered only if they contribute to national 






Transparency is essential in the evaluation of AIJ projects, the reporting of 
agreements reached, and in performance monitoring. 
AIJ projects must contribute to the achievement of the objective of the 
UNFCCC by aiming to bring about in a cost effective manner real, 
measurable and long-term environmental benefits related to the 
mitigation of climate change that would not have occurred in the absence 
of such activities. 
Methodologies used for the evaluation of AIJ projects must be carefully 
selected so as to ensure the effective measurement of global benefits and 
total and incremental costs. 
Funding for AIJ projects should be additional to all existing funding and 
technology transfer provided for under the UNFCCC. 
10. South Africa supports AIJ as a defined, finite phase and notes that the 
ending or continuation of AIJ will be evaluated by the year 2 000. The 
terms of participation during the subsequent Jl phase will be based upon a 
national position on Jl or any alternative; such a national policy will be 
formulated in due course. 
11. The AIJ pilot phase must be used to develop capacity in South Africa so 
that full local understand of issues relating to the implementation of the 
UNFCCC is achieved. This enhanced understanding will improve South 
Africa's ability to judge the potential positive or negative impacts of 
foreseen crediting mechanisms and future resource requirements. 
No position currently exists on Joint Implementation due to the divergent views 
and uncertainties surrounding the issue of credit allocation. It is hoped that 
experience gained during the AIJ phase will reduce the uncertainties and inform 
the current debate. 










Activities Implemented Jointly I 
Joint Implementation Working Group 
Terms of reference 
64 
The Working Group on Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) and Joint 
Implementation (JI) is a substructure of the NCCC and represents the interim 
clearing house for AIJ/JI issues and proposals pending the formulation of a 
national position on AIJ/JI as part of the development of a national climate 
change policy. 
The main aim of the AI]/JI Working Group is to facilitate the information 
dissemination, capacity building, and opportunity for discussion needed to enable 
the formulation of a national position on AI] and JI. 
The AIJ/JI Working Group is responsible for: 
• Dissemination of information on AIJ and Jl to the NCCC and other interested 
and affected parties. 
• Creation of opportunities for national and sectoral discussions on AI] and Jl, 
including the organisation of national information workshops and seminars 
and the promotion of discussion on AIJ and Jl at NCCC meeting. 
• Structure and manage the process of formulating a national position on 
AIJ/JI, including continual evaluation of further steps to be taken with regard 
to capacity building and information dissemination. 
• Act as a national and international contact point for all AI]/JI issues. 
• Act as an advisory group to the NCCC, and national and provincial 
government with regard to AIJ and Jl issues and proposals. 
• Draft a list of criteria for the evaluation of proposed AI] and Jl projects. 
• Pre-screen potential AIJ and Jl projects and make recommendations to the 
NCCC in this regard. 
Draft an interim position statement on AIJ/JI for discussion by the NCCC. 
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